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NOTES
Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Holden Beach Enterprises: Preserving Beach Access Through
Public Prescription
Coastal states have seen a fundamental conflict emerge over title to
their oceanfront beaches. Increasing demand for residential and commercial beachfront development has compelled the transfer of title to
oceanfront property from the hands of the state or individuals with extensive undeveloped land holdings into the hands of individual lot owners. The resulting conflict is simple and universal. The public harbors
the expectation, instilled through generations of unrestricted use, that
oceanfront beaches lie within the public domain and that access to these
beaches is guaranteed by some public right.' On the other side of the
conflict, oceanfront property owners, most of whom paid premium prices
for their land, assert that the rights of ownership vested in them are no
narrower than those vested in an inland owner. These landowners object
to public passage across or recreational use of their property out of concern that it may restrict their ability to develop the land or may reduce
the value inherent in an "exclusive" residential subdivision or resort location.2 On North Carolina's barrier islands, this conflict between public
expectation and the demands of oceanfront property owners has grown
incrementally as construction of public infrastructure has stimulated development. In most cases, public recreational and commercial use of
barrier islands begins long before intensive residential development because permanent households are dependent on improved roads, bridges,
or ferries, while recreational and commercial use occurs when an island
can be reached only by boats, wooden bridges, and sand roads. This
scenario breeds conflict between prior users and private landowners. In
North Carolina, demand for oceanfront residential development has exploded over the last two decades,3 fueling a rapid transition from open
1. See State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969); Richard S. Goldman, Note, Access to Public MunicipalBeaches: The Formulationof a Comprehensive Legal Approach, 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 936, 961, 966-69 (1973); Elizabeth Leland,
Development Puts Beach Out of Reach, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 1, 1989, at Al.
2. See MARK E. SULLIVAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BEACH AccESS, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL 1-2 (1977); Steve A. McKeon, Note, Public
Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564, 564-66 (1970).

3. Janet Olson, Development Thrives on Coast, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Apr. 3,
1989, at IA; Mason Peters, Population Waves Boom Along N.C. Coasts'sDunes, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REc., Dec. 31, 1985, at Bl.
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beaches and dunes to private subdivisions on many barrier islands. For
these reasons, the North Carolina courts are now being forced to determine the extent of public and private rights in oceanfront beaches.
The clash between private and public expectations concerning publie use of oceanfront beaches generates two distinct issues. One issue is
"perpendicular access," which encompasses access from the public road
across private upland property to the beach. Easements allowing perpen4
dicular access have traditionally been created through eminent domain,
5
6
prescription, or implied dedication. "Lateral access" involves access
across and recreational use of privately owned areas of the beach.
In North Carolina, as in most states,7 title to the "foreshore," the
land lying between the mean high tide line8 and the mean low tide line, is
inalienably vested in the state.9 Title to property landward of the mean
high tide line can be privately held. 10 Public use of oceanfront beaches
almost invariably extends beyond the foreshore to the "dry-sand," the
area lying between the mean high tide line and the first line of stable
vegetation. Public use of the dry-sand beach is the subject of the lateral
beach access issue. Coastal states around the country have confronted
the question whether the public possesses some vested right to use the
dry-sand beach." Several courts have relied on the common-law doctrines of public prescription, 2 implied dedication, 13 custom, 14 or the
4. Eminent domain is the power of government to take private land for public use. See
RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.3, at 435 (4th ed. 1991). Because
such takings invoke the Fifth Amendment right to payment ofjust compensation, a principal
goal of state beach access programs is to preserve public rights created through other commonlaw doctrines in order to avoid having to rely on eminent domain.
5. See infra text accompanying note 20.
6. Implied dedication occurs when the elements of common-law dedication-intent on
the part of the owners to dedicate land to public use and acceptance by the public-can be
unequivocally proven by the conduct of the parties alone. 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 369, at 432-33 (5th ed. 1980).
7. 1 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY %163,
at 698 (1991); B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Rights to Land Created at Water'sEdge by Filling or

Dredging, 91 A.L.R.2D 857, 859 (1963).
8. The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined this term as "a mean or average high-

tide, and not as the extreme height of the water." Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town
of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970) (emphasis added).
9. Id at 302, 177 S.E.2d at 516; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(a) (1990).
10. CarolinaBeach, 277 N.C. at 302, 177 S.E.2d at 516.

11. See Alice G. Carmichael, Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: PublicAccess to North CarolinaBeaches, 64 N.C. L. REv. 159, 162-75, 180-84 (1985).
12. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974); Moody
v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 377-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); cf. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254
Or. 584, 594, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969) (recognizing doctrine but not relying on it).
13. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162,
171 (1970); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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public trust"5 to find that public rights do or can exist in the dry-sand
beach. 6 A few states, however, have refused to do so, allowing purchasers of beaches long used by the public to close these beaches for exclusive
use.

17

In Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Holden Beach Enterprises18 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied
the public prescription doctrine to facts involving both perpendicular and
lateral beach access issues.19 Prescription is a common-law doctrine similar to adverse possession; it enables an individual who continually
crosses another's land for a long period of time to perfect a permanent
private easement in the path used.2" Public prescription, by which a public easement is created, operates in a manner similar to private prescription, but requires that the nature and extent of the use throughout the
prescriptive period be sufficiently public to give the landowner notice that
a public easement has been claimed.2 1 A few states have not recognized
public prescription.2 2 In Concerned Citizens the North Carolina
Supreme Court significantly expanded the doctrine of public prescription
to make both perpendicular and lateral beach access easier to acquire.
This Note discusses relevant aspects of the prescription doctrine:
the "adverse use" element,2 3 the "uninterrupted" element,24 the "substantial identity" element,2" and the significance of public maintenance in
proving public prescription,2 6 and considers other common-law theories
14. See United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 773 (D.V.I.
1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 316-17, 440 P.2d 76,
77-78 (1968); Thornton, 254 Or. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
15. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 332, 471 A.2d 355, 368,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
16. See generally Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., PublicAccess to CoastalPublicProperty: Judicial
Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 631-43 (1989) (discussing cases applying
common-law doctrine).
17. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989); Opinion of the Justices, 383
Mass. 895, 897-98, 916, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1096-97, 1106 (1981).
18. 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677 (1991).
19. Id. at 44-45, 404 S.E.2d at 682-88.
20. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 335, at 140-41.
21. Daniel A. Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription,24 SYRACUSE L. Rrv. 935, 953 (1973).
22. Both Connecticut and New York hold that "the unorganized public" cannot acquire
rights by prescription. See Miller v. Grossman Shoes, Inc., 186 Conn. 229, 233-34, 404 A.2d
302, 304 (1982); Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v. Baroth, 147 Misc. 2d 404, 408, 555 N.Y.S.2d
1000, 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); see 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 342, at 208.
23. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 137-53 and accompanying text.
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used to preserve lateral access to public beaches. The Note concludes
that the tests adopted by the Concerned Citizens court for determining
the existence of the essential elements of public prescription created a
reasonable expansion of the prescription doctrine that mirrors positions
adopted in the majority of states. The Note suggests that the precedent
established in Concerned Citizens will make it possible for the public to
acquire rights of recreational use in the dry-sand beach through the doctrine of public prescription, and asserts that public rights to use the drysand beach should also be recognized through the public trust doctrine. 28
Holden Beach West is a residential subdivision on the western end
of Holden Beach,2 9 a barrier island located near the southern extreme of
North Carolina's coastline. In 1986, a group of citizens initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking to prevent Holden Beach Enterprises,
the developer of Holden Beach West, from obstructing access to a road
that the developer had constructed through the subdivision from the
western end of an existing public road westward to Shallotte Inlet.30 The
North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development intervened as a plaintiff on behalf of the people of the state.3 1
The claimants alleged that the subdivision road had become a public
right-of-way either by prescriptive public use or by implied dedication. 32
The trial judge, sitting as the factfinder, held that the claimants' evidence
was insufficient to perfect an interest in the road by prescription or implied dedication.3 3 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court in all respects, adding, in response to the claimants' argument
that rights of recreational use of the dry-sand beach were vested in the
public by virtue of the public trust doctrine, that the public trust doctrine
should not be extended to "deprive individual property owners of some
portion of their property rights without compensation." ' 34 A closely di27. See infra notes 154-200 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 201-75 and accompanying text.
29. Holden Beach, which is west of Lockwood Folly Inlet and Long Beach and east of
Shallotte Inlet and Ocean Isle Beach, lies along the southernmost stretch of North Carolina's
coast. This stretch of coastline lies on an east-west axis. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 40,
404 S.E.2d at 679.
30. Id. at 39-40, 404 S.E.2d at 679.
31. The Department of Natural Resources and Community Development intervened on
the grounds that it was authorized to enforce North Carolina's Beach Access program under
§ 113A-134.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id. at 39, 404 S.E.2d at 679. Pursuant
to state government reorganization, this authority is now vested in the Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources under the same statute.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden Beach Enters.,
95 N.C. App. 38, 46, 381 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1989), rev'd, 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677 (1991).
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vided North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the lower courts had misapplied the common-law tests for public
prescription. 35 The supreme court expressly disavowed the court of appeals' statements concerning the public trust doctrine,3 6 but did not

otherwise address the public trust or dedication issues.37

Seasonally, for approximately forty years, members of the public
crossed the property now known as Holden Beach West to fish, hunt,
camp, and drive on the sands near Shallotte Inlet.38 Prior to 1962, when
Holden Beach Enterprises purchased the property, this use had occurred
with the implied, if not express, permission of the landowner. 39 To aid in
analysis of the Concerned Citizens holding, the path over which the public easement was claimed may be divided into three distinct sections.
The first section of the path extended one-quarter mile from the eastern
boundary of the subdivision to the western edge of the overwash area.'
This section of the path could be characterized as a typical sand road; it
consisted of a two-rut path that ran along the landward side of the frontal dunes. 4 ' Smaller trails were located along this road where drivers
turned off to get to the sound or the beach, and the location of the path
over this area shifted at times when drivers compensated for dune movement, avoided flooded areas, or left the path to avoid oncoming vehicles,
but it generally remained in an identifiable line.42 The second section of
the path crossed an area approximately one-third of a mile wide known
as the "overwash area."'4 3 The overwash area was created in 1954 when
Hurricane Hazel cut a new inlet through Holden Beach Island.'
Although this inlet quickly filled in, it left behind a low-lying area where
the dunes had been destroyed and the dry-sand beach was very wide; this
35. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 54-55, 404 S.E.2d at 688.
36. Id. at 55, 404 S.E.2d at 688.
37. The court's decision to disavow the court of appeals' refusal to expand the public trust
doctrine is important because Concerned Citizens may serve as a stepping stone to a future
judicial expansion of the public trust doctrine creating public rights of access to areas of the
dry-sand beach. See infra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
38. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 42, 404 S.E.2d at 680.
39. Id. at 56, 404 S.E.2d at 689 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The fact that the use before
1962 was permissive in nature is not expressly acknowledged by the majority. It can be implied, however, from the reasoning of the majority opinion, which is primarily concerned with
the period from 1962 to 1986. This fact is critical because prescriptive use must be adverse.
See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text. Thus, the prescriptive use in the Concerned
Citizens case did not begin until 1962.
40. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 42, 404 S.E.2d at 680. For a description of the
overwash area, see infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
41. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 42-45, 404 S.E.2d at 680-82.
42. Id. at 43-44, 404 S.E.2d at 681-82.
43. Id. at 42-45, 404 S.E.2d at 680-82.
44. Id.
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wide beach remained subject to frequent overwash during storms.45 Use
of the overwash area took three forms. First, the overwash area was the
primary destination for many sun-seekers. Second, persons driving toward the inlet at low tide would proceed oceanward across the overwash
area to get to the foreshore, where the sand was packed and easy to drive
on. Third, at high tide, persons travelling toward the inlet would drive
laterally across the overwash area to reach the sand road running behind
the dunes on the west side of the overwash area. The precise locations of
these routes were impossible to pinpoint over the years because trails
across the wide beach were erased during large storms. 46 The third section of the path ran from the west side of the overwash area to the general vicinity of the inlet.47 While the part of this section nearest the
overwash generally followed an identifiable path, the western end was
48
described as "random loops and trails.
Between 1977 and 1978, Holden Beach Enterprises constructed a
marl road4 9 through the subdivision in the same general location as the
sand road. 0 The sand road, however, had curved where the subdivision
road was straight, and, while the road did cross the old path at some
points, the two ran up to 200 feet apart in some places."1 The developer
aligned the subdivision road with the state primary public road to the
east, and paved the subdivision road in 1985, after the state completed
paving the public road.5 2 It was over this subdivision road that the
claimants sought a public easement. Although the Town of Holden
Beach used the road to provide municipal services to subdivision residences, all costs for construction and paving of the subdivision road were
borne by the developer.5 3 Between 1962 and 1985, in an escalating effort
to prevent trespass across his land, the developer posted many "No Tres45. Id. at 41, 404 S.E.2d at 680.
46. The use of the overwash area was not described fully in the majority opinion. For a
summary of testimony describing the use of the overwash area, see Joint Brief for the PlaintiffAppellants and Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant at 30, Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden Beach Enters., 95 N.C. App. 38, 381 S.E.2d 810 (1989) (No.
8813SC1075), rev'd, 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677 (1991).
47. The length of the third section did not remain constant because Shallotte Inlet gradually shifted eastward between 1960 and 1985. See map appearing on next page for a diagram
of the beach.
48. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 43, 404 S.E.2d at 681.
49. The term "marl" describes a roadbed consisting of crushed shells and clay. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICioNARY 1383 (1976).

50. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 41, 404 S.E.2d at 680.
51. Id. at 43-44, 404 S.E.2d at 681-82.
52. Id. at 41-42, 404 S.E.2d at 680-81.
53. The Town of Holden Beach used the subdivision road to supply fire and police protection, garbage service, and a water line; the Town also posted street signs on the road. Id. at 42,
404 S.E.2d at 681.
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passing" signs, placed telephone poles across the road, stretched a padlocked cable across the road to a length of 200 feet, constructed
numerous gates, posted guards, and warned users that he would have
them arrested for trespass." While these efforts succeeded in turning
away some beachgoers, they were ignored or destroyed by many, and the
number of people using the road increased over the years as public use of
Holden Beach Island increased. 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Meyer identified two chief grounds
for reversal. The court first turned to the question of substantial identity,
and held that the requirement that " '[t]here must be substantial identity
of the easement claimed' " in order to perfect an easement by prescription did not require that the use be "confined to a definite and specific
line of travel for twenty years. "56 Rather, the test requires only "'substantial identity' of a definite and specific line" sufficient to give the
owner of the servient land "notice of not only the adverse claim, but the
extent of it as well."' 57 In addition, the trial court must "take into account the character of the land over which one claims an easement when
determining whether the easement has substantially retained its identity.""8 Finally, changes in a path made to avoid natural obstructions or
to suit the convenience of the landowner do not destroy the substantial
identity of an easement.5 9 Turning next to the interruption question, the
court held that the trial court's finding that the State could not prove
continuous and uninterrupted use under these facts was erroneous.6 0
Rather, "[tlhe fact that the barricades placed by the [owner of the servient land] may . . . discourage[ ] the use of the pathway . . . or even
suspend[ ] its use very briefly.., does not destroy.., continuity of
use." 61 Moreover, unsuccessful attempts to interrupt use, including
those that make the use of a way less convenient, "will not prevent the
use from ripening into an easement."'62 Both of the court's reasons for
reversal represent substantial changes in the law of prescription in North
Carolina. A significant omission from the Concerned Citizens opinion
should also be noted: The court did not address whether the standards
for public prescription in North Carolina differ in any way from those
54.
55.
56.
S.E.2d
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 49-51, 404 S.E.2d at 685-86.
Id.
Id. at 45-46, 404 S.E.2d at 682-83 (quoting West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 49-50, 326
601, 610-11 (1985)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 47, 404 S.E.2d at 683.
Id. at 48, 404 S.E.2d at 684.
Id. at 49, 404 S.E.2d at 684-85.
Id. at 49, 404 S.E.2d at 685.
Id. at 52, 404 S.E.2d at 686.
Id. at 54, 404 S.E.2d at 687.
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established for private prescription. This omission is important because
prior decisions have suggested that maintenance of a roadway by public
officials is an essential element of public prescription in North Carolina. 3
Justice Mitchell dissented, arguing that the actions taken by the developer were sufficient to constitute an interruption of prescriptive use as
a matter of law."1 Stating that any barrier erected by a landowner that
prevents the "full and free enjoyment of the easement" for any period of
time, "however brief[ ]," should constitute an interruption of prescriptive
use,6 1 Justice Mitchell suggested that any "act[ ] which would block...
public use sufficiently to be criminal if done in a public highway" should
be considered an effective interruption of public use of a prescriptive
easement. 6 Finally, the dissent pointed out the majority's failure to address the argument that, as a matter of law, the easement did not exist
because "control of it has [not been] accepted by properly constituted
public authorities," but the dissent did not offer an opinion on this
issue.67
To acquire an easement by prescription in North Carolina, a claimant must prove that her use has been (1) "adverse, hostile, or under claim
of right," (2) "open and notorious," and (3) "continuous and uninterrupted for a period of twenty years," and that (4) there has been "substantial identity of the easement claimed."' 68 These four essential
elements have remained virtually unchanged for over fifty years. 69 The
burden the claimant must meet to prove each element, however, has been
the subject of a slow and at times inconsistent evolution. The development of the law has been inconsistent for two reasons. More importantly, since 1850, the doctrine of prescription in North Carolina has
undergone a slow transformation from a theory based on the commonlaw doctrine of the lost grant to a theory based on an analogy to adverse
63. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
64. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 55, 404 S.E.2d at 688 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). Justices Webb and Whichard joined the dissent. Id at 61, 404 S.E.2d at 691 (Mitchell, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 59, 404 S.E.2d at 690 (Mitchell, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The majority and dissent disagreed sharply on the factual question of how successful the developer had actually been in interrupting traffic across
his land for substantial lengths of time. Id. at 60, 404 S.E.2d at 691 (Mitchell, ., dissenting).
This disparity is significant because it indicates that the majority's concern for the public policy goal of providing public beach access may have colored its interpretation of the facts. See
infra text accompanying note 216.
67. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 56, 404 S.E.2d at 688 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
68. E.g., Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 580-81, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900-01 (1974).
69. See, eg., West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 49-50, 326 S.E.2d 601, 610-11 (1985); Dickinson,
284 N.C. at 580-81, 201 S.E.2d at 900-01; Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 188,
193 S.E. 153, 154-55 (1937).
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possession.7" In addition, the essential elements of prescription are interrelated. For example, use may be deemed permissive, negating the essential element of adverse use, if no substantial attempt has been made by
the landowner to interrupt it, while any substantial attempt by the landowner to interrupt use may be construed as negating the essential element of continuous and uninterrupted use.7 1 Similarly, if a claimant
forsakes one path over a landowner's property for another, this change
may be construed as an abandonment of the earlier path representing a
lapse in continuous use, as a deviation from the earlier path that may
defeat the "substantial identity" essential element, or simply as evidence
of permissive use.7 2
The requirement that use be "adverse, hostile, or by claim of
right"7 3 has been the subject of considerable litigation in North Carolina.
Before 1850, North Carolina followed the view, derived from the theory
70. The prescription doctrine derived from the common-law theory of the lost grant,
under which the courts created the fiction that an easement was granted in years past in a deed
that was subsequently lost. See Jerome J. Curtis, Reviving the Lost Grant, 23 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 535, 537-38 (1988). The doctrine operated to preclude a landowner from
presenting evidence that a grant had not been made if the claimant could show continuous,
peaceable use for a long period of time and that the use had occurred under claim of right. See
1 SIR EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LIT'LETON 113b (Francis Hargrave & Charles
Butler eds., Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1853) (1659); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 337, at
162. American courts have altered the theoretical basis for the prescription doctrine by shifting from the lost grant theory to a theory based on adverse possession. Id.; see also Curtis,
supra, at 536-41 (describing the development of the law from the lost grant theory to the
analogy to the statute of limitations for adverse possession). Thus, American courts generally
require that the claimant prove use that is open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted,
adverse, and under claim of right to perfect an easement by prescription. See 2 THOMPSON,
supra note 6, § 340, at 190-91. Prescription, however, differs from adverse possession in two
significant ways. First, adverse possession occurs when the statute of limitations runs on a
landowner's right to bring an action to recover possession; in contrast, there is no statute of
limitations on the right of a landowner in possession to sue in trespass when persons are crossing his property. Thus, prescription is a judicial doctrine while adverse possession is, fundamentally, a creature of statute. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.7, at 455-56 (1984). Second, to acquire property by adverse possession, a claimant must prove exclusive possession. See id. § 11.7, at 762. While most jurisdictions allow
nonexclusive prescriptive use, some create a presumption of permissive use when use is nonexclusive. See 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 343, at 214-16.
71. John G. Aldridge, Note, PrescriptiveAcquisition in North Carolina,45 N.C. L. REV.
284, 292-94 (1966).
72. See, eg., Long Island Beach Buggy Ass'n v. Town of Islip, 58 Misc. 2d 295, 296, 295
N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 35 A.D.2d 739, 316 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1970).
73. These terms are used interchangeably by the courts. E.g., Dickinson, 284 N.C. at 581,
201 S.E.2d at 900. It is most useful to conceive of the collective elements in the phrase "adverse, hostile or by claim of right" as a term of art connoting the claimant's burden of proof
that the use was not permissive in nature and that the landowner was given notice that a
property interest adverse to his own was being claimed. Dulin v. Faires, 266 N.C. 257, 261,
145 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966).
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of the lost grant, that continued use over a long period of time created
the presumption that the use was adverse. 74 This presumption of adverse

use continues to control in the majority of states.7" After 1850, however,
North Carolina gradually shifted to a presumption of permissive use, requiring the claimant to prove by contrary fact that a landowner did not
impliedly give the claimant a license to cross his land.7 6 This burden has
been difficult to overcome." For example, when a claimant had crossed
74. See State v. Hunter, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 369, 370 (1845); Gerenger v. Summers, 24 N.C.
(2 Ired.) 229, 232 (1842); Pugh v. Wheeler, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 50, 59 (1836); Wilson v.
Wilson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 154, 155-56 (1833); Brent C. Shaffer, Note, Acquiring Public Use of
Roadway by Statute and PrescriptiveEasement in North Carolina-West v. Slick, 21 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 807, 810 (1986).
75. See, eg., 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 335, at 144; J.E. Macy, Annotation, Easement
by Prescription: Presumption andBurden of Proofas to Adverse Characterof Use, 170 A.L.R.
776, 778-92 (1947). Professor Cunningham argues that the adverse presumption is the better
view for the simple reason that an intrusion on another's property without express permission
or license is a trespass and therefore adverse to the fee owner's property interest. CUNNINGHAM et al., supra note 70, § 8.7, at 452-53. Professor Cunningham views the presumption of
permissive use as the unfortunate result of the theory of the lost grant, a theory that he states
was not the theoretical foundation of the prescription doctrine in America and should be relegated to the status of a historical curiosity. Id. at 451-53.
This argument may be challenged on two counts. First, the theory of the lost grant is less
conducive to a permissive presumption than is a prescription theory based on an analogy to
adverse possession because, while both theories require adverse use, only the lost grant theory
requires "peaceable" use and landowner "acquiescence." Thus, under the lost grant theory,
the claimant must prove both that the use occurred without permission and that the landowner
acquiesced to it (by failing to object); in contrast, under the analogy to adverse possession, the
claimant must prove only that the use was without permission. See Curtis,supra note 70, at
543. Because evidence of lack of permission and evidence of peaceable use and landowner
acquiescence will generally be conflicting, a presumption of permissive use is inconsistent with
the lost grant theory. See id at 543-44. Second, at least in North Carolina, the fiction of the
lost grant was without question the theoretical basis for the development of the prescription
doctrine. See Aldridge, supranote 71, at 287-92. Like other jurisdictions, North Carolina has
slowly extricated its prescription doctrine from the lost grant theory. Id It may be argued
that, as a result, North Carolina should also unburden itself of its permissive presumption.
76. See Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 666-67, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1981) (expressly
refusing to reject North Carolina's "present position that a user is presumed to be permissive
and adopt the rule, obtaining in the majority of jurisdictions, that the user is presumed to be
adverse"). The transition from the adverse presumption to the permissive presumption can be
traced through the following cases: Snowden v. Bell, 159 N.C. 497, 499, 75 S.E. 721, 721
(1912), aff'd, 166 N.C. 208, 80 S.E. 888 (1914); Boyden v. Achenbach, 86 N.C. 397, 399
(1882); Ray v. Lipscomb, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 185, 186 (1855); Smith v. Bennett, 46 N.C. (1
Jones) 372, 373 (1854); Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 39, 43 (1853); Mebane v. Patrick, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 23, 25 (1853); Felton v. Simpson, 33 N.C. (11 Ired.) 84, 85-86 (1850).
See Aldridge, supranote 71, at 287-92 (providing a summary of the development of the law of
prescription in North Carolina); Macy, supra note 75, at 800-01.
77. See Aldridge, supra note 71, at 290-92; Macy, supra note 75, at 800-01. But see Shaffer, supra note 74, at 811 (concluding that "the North Carolina presumption of permission is
so easy to refute that a change to the majority view would lead to virtually no difference in
result"). Shaffer relies on Dulin, 266 N.C. 257, 145 S.E.2d 873, for the proposition that the
permissive presumption is refuted easily, because the Dulin court held the presumption rebut-
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another's land without express permission for fifty years, removed obstructions when they were placed across the road, and threatened to sue
the landowner if an obstruction was not removed immediately, the
supreme court held that the claimant had failed to overcome the presumption of permissive use. 7' This led one commentator to conclude
that prescription could not be proved in North Carolina unless the landowner expressly or actively objected to the use or expressly acquiesced to
the user's adverse right.7 9 In other words, an easement could not be perfected by a showing of "quiet acquiescence" alone, even if the use had
continued for generations. 80 More recent cases indicate that a claimant
ted when a claimant never requested permission to use a road and a landowner never objected
to the use. See id at 261-63, 145 S.E.2d at 876-77. This reliance on Dulin is misplaced. The
Dulin court found as a fact that the landowner had expressly stated during the prescriptive
period that the claimant owned the road in question and was responsible for its upkeep. Id. at
260-61, 145 S.E.2d at 877. While this Note agrees that claimants' success in rebutting the
presumption of permissive use has increased substantially since Dickinson, the permissive presumption continues to defeat prescription in some cases in which easements could be perfected
under the majority rule. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
78. Weaver v. Pitts, 191 N.C. 747, 748-49, 133 S.E. 2, 2-3 (1926). The Weaver court may
have been influenced by the fact that a public road providing access to the same points as the
alleged prescriptive road had recently been created. Id.
79. Aldridge, supra note 71, at 289-92; see also Henry v. Farlow, 238 N.C. 542, 544, 78
S.E.2d 244, 246 (1953) ("Neither law nor logic can confer upon a silent use a greater probative
value than that inherent in a mere use."). Both the owner and the claimant remained silent in
Henry. Id. at 543, 78 S.E.2d at 244-45.
80. See Henry, 238 N.C. at 544, 78 S.E.2d at 246; Aldridge, supra note 71, at 289-92. It
has generally been held in American jurisdictions that prescriptive acquisition requires "open,
exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use[] under [a] claim of right with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner for the prescriptive period." 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements
§§ 49, 63 (1966); see 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 413, at 34-104
to 34-136.3 (1990). This formulation of the prescription doctrine is a hybrid of the elements of
the lost grant and adverse possession theories, and is indicative of the confusion engendered by
the evolution from one theory to the other. "Acquiescence" has been defined within the lexicon of prescriptive acquisition as "consent by silence, passive assent or submission." 2
THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 337, at 164. Under the lost grant theory, this term described the
nature of the use that lay between use with landowner permission and use in the face of express
landowner objection. See Curtis,supra note 70, at 544. The doctrine of acquiescence should
not be applied to a theory of prescription based solely on an analogy to the statute of limitations for adverse possession because adverse possession does not require silence, assent, or
submission. See CUNNINGHAM et al., supra note 70, § 8.7 at 453. In North Carolina "acquiescence" is not an element of prescriptive acquisition; the term disappeared from the case law in
the early 1900s. In addition, "quiet acquiescence," or the failure to object to use by another, is
construed as evidence of permissive use. See Aldridge, supra note 71, at 291-92; see also State
v. Norris, 174 N.C. 808, 809, 93 S.E. 950, 951 (1919) (holding that the "mere fact that [claimant] was using a pathway across the defendant's land for his own convenience will not be given
the effect of an adverse user without evidence to support it" because "[t]he quiet acquiescence
of the defendant in such use, as an act of neighborhood courtesy, will not be allowed to prejudice him"); Snowden, 159 N.C. at 499, 75 S.E. at 721 (declining to "'deduce from the owner's
...simple act of neighborhood courtesy, in [granting] the use of a way convenient to others
and not injurious to himself, over land unimproved or in woods, consequences so seriously
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may be able to rebut the presumption of permissive use when the landowner has quietly acquiesced in the claimant's use for a very long period
of time and when the claimant has undertaken to maintain the road in
some way, albeit slight. 8 The courts, however, continue to recite the
fundamental rule that "[a] mere permissive use of a way over another's
land, however long it may be continued, can never ripen into an easement by prescription." 2
The "continuous" and "uninterrupted" requirements may be viewed
as distinct elements of prescription. A lapse in continuity connotes inaction by a claimant who fails to assert his claim to a path with the frequency necessary to give the landowner notice of his claim; the requisite
frequency varies greatly depending on the nature of the use by which the
detracting from the value of the land thus used, and compel him needlessly to interpose and
prevent the enjoyment of the privilege in order to the preservation of the right of property
unimpaired' ") (quoting Boyden, 86 N.C. at 398-99).
81. See Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 668, 273 S.E.2d 285, 289 (1981) (holding that a
claimant had successfully rebutted the presumption of permissive use by showing 50 years' use
without express permission and that claimant had graded and graveled the road); Dickinson,
284 N.C. at 583-84, 201 S.E.2d at 901 (holding that a claimant had successfully rebutted the
presumption of permissive use by showing 30 years' use without express permission, that
claimants had performed the slight maintenance-raking leaves and scattering oyster shellsnecessary to maintain road, and that the road was the only access to claimant's home). A
series of North Carolina Court of Appeals cases have suggested that maintenance of the roadway and the fact that the roadway was the sole means of access to the claimant's property are
extremely important, if not essential, factors in rebutting the presumption of permissive use
when the permission has never been requested, but the landowner has not objected. See Presley v. Griggs, 88 N.C. App. 226, 233-35, 362 S.E.2d 830, 834-35 (1987); Perry v. Williams, 84
N.C. App. 527, 529, 353 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1987); Williams v. Sapp, 83 N.C. App. 116, 121, 349
S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1986); Dotson v. Payne, 71 N.C. App. 691, 697-98, 323 S.E.2d 362, 366-67
(1984); Newsome v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 419, 422, 289 S.E.2d 149, 150-51 (1982).
"A 'hostile' use is simply a use of such nature and exercised under such circumstances as
to manifest and give notice that the use is being made under a claim of right." Dickinson, 284
N.C. at 581, 201 S.E.2d at 900 (citing Dulin, 266 N.C. at 261, 145 S.E.2d at 875). The list of
"circumstances" that can evidence adverse or hostile use in North Carolina includes the following: (1) Use under color of title, see Johnson v. Stanley, 96 N.C. App. 72, 75, 384 S.E.2d
577, 579 (1989); Higdon v. Davis, 71 N.C. App. 640, 650-51, 324 S.E.2d 5, 13 (1984) (holding
use under color of title sufficient to give notice that use was under claim of right), rev'd in part,
315 N.C. 208, 219, 337 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1985) (finding that use did not occur under color of
title); (2) continuing use despite physical acts or speech on the part of the landowner objecting
to the use, see Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 54-55, 404 S.E.2d at 686 (1991); (3) maintenance by the claimant, see Potts, 301 N.C. at 668, 273 S.E.2d at 289; (4) use over a way that
provides the sole means of access to claimant's property, see Dickinson, 284 N.C. at 583-84,
201 S.E.2d at 902; (5) continuous use for an extremely long period of time, see Potts, 301 N.C.
at 688, 273 S.E.2d at 289; (6) prior admission by landowner that claimant had right to use
path, see Dulin, 266 N.C. at 262, 145 S.E.2d at 876-77; and, of course, (7) express statements
by the claimant throughout the prescriptive period claiming a property interest in the right-ofway, see Perry, 84 N.C. App. at 529, 353 S.E.2d at 228.
82. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 49, 326 S.E.2d 601, 611 (1985) (citing Dickinson, 284 N.C.
at 581, 201 S.E.2d at 900).
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easement is claimed.8 3 For example, in Concerned Citizens a lapse in use

during the winter months did not defeat continuity because the nature of
the use was seasonal.8 4 An interruption of prescriptive use connotes ac-

tivity by the landowner that prevents the claimant's use of the path for a
period of time or defeats the adverse use element.8 5 There exist among
the states significant differences in the level of landowner objection neces-

sary to constitute an interruption of prescriptive use. A majority of
states require intent to interrupt, an overt act toward that end, and actual
success in interrupting use for some substantial period of time.86 A significant minority, however, require only an overt action representing an
assertion of ownership and manifesting intent to interrupt use, regardless
of whether use ever actually ceases.8 7 The legal effects of an interruption

of prescriptive use and of a lapse in continuous use are identical-the
prescriptive clock is reset to zero.
The only North Carolina case that directly addresses what a landowner must do to interrupt prescriptive use is Ingraham v. Hough.8 8 The
Ingraham court held that "an act done by the owner of the servient tenement which would prevent the full and free enjoyment of the easement"
or "any act which, if done in a public highway, would be an indictable
offense" should be considered an interruption of prescriptive use.8 9 Ingrahamhas been cited in other jurisdictions and by commentators for the
proposition that a mere verbal protest, unaccompanied by physical ob-

structions, is sufficient to constitute an interruption of prescriptive use. 9°
83. See, eg., Downing v. Grover, 237 Mont. 172, 176, 772 P.2d 850, 852 (1989).
84. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 687-88.
85. Downing, 237 Mont. at 176, 772 P.2d at 852.
86. See Bull v. Salsman, 435 So. 2d 27, 30 (Ala. 1983); Guerra v. Packard, 236 Cal. App.
2d 272, 294, 46 Cal. Rptr. 25, 37 (1965); South Norwalk Lodge v. Palco Hats, 140 Conn. 370,
374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953); Lofland v. Truitt, 260 A.2d 909, 912 (Del. Ch. 1969); Shuggars
v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 46, 234 A.2d 752, 757-58 (1967); Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d 725,
728 (Miss. 1976); Trustees of Forestgreen Estates v. Minton, 510 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Mo.
1974); Keefer v. Jones, 467 Pa. 544, 550-51, 359 A.2d 735, 738 (1976); Huff v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 38 Wash. 2d 103, 113, 228 P.2d 121, 127 (1951); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 347, at
250-51.
87. Chicago Steel v. Malan Constr. Co., 200 Ill. App. 3d 701, 708, 558 N.E.2d 341, 345
(1990); Gadreault v. Hillman, 317 Mass. 656, 662-63, 59 N.E.2d 477, 481 (1945); Rice v.
Miller, 306 Minn. 523, 526, 238 N.W.2d 609, 610-11 (1976); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201,
209 n.5, 593 P.2d 1138, 1143 n.5 (1979); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 347, at 253.
88. 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 39 (1853). Ingraham was ignored by the majority in Concerned
Citizens and only briefly noted by the dissent. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 59, 404 S.E.2d
at 690 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
89. Ingraham, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) at 44.
90. See, eg., Conness v. Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank, 46 Ariz. 338, 340-41, 50
P.2d 888, 889-90 (1935); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 347, at 253-54 n.35; Annotation, What
Will Disprove Acquiescence by Owner Essential to Easement by Prescriptionin Case of Known
Use, 5 A.L.R. 1325, 1325-26 (1920).
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One commentator concluded that prescription could be proved in North
Carolina only if the landowner expressly acquiesced in the claimant's
right to use the way, because silence on the part of the landowner was
deemed evidence of permissive use, while any protest by the landowner
constituted an interruption of prescriptive use.91
This reliance on Ingraham may have been misplaced. Ingraham
was decided during a transitional period in the law of prescription when
the North Carolina courts indulged in the fiction of the lost grant by
presuming a prior grant if the use of a path had been long, continuous,
and peaceable. 92 Because the common law was moving toward an analogy to adverse possession, however, the courts illogically held that this
presumption could be rebutted by evidence that no such grant had occurred. 93 Most importantly, the Ingraham test for prescription, founded
on the lost grant theory, required uninterrupted "peaceable" use and
landowner "acquiescence," while the modem prescription test, based on
an analogy to the statute of limitations in adverse possession, does not
require "peaceable" use or landowner "acquiescence" and places much
greater weight on the requirement that the use be "adverse, hostile, or by
claim of right." 94 Because the lost grant theory focused on "passive assent"9" by the landowner, while the adverse possession theory does not
require "passive assent" and demands evidence that the use was openly
adverse to the landowner's property interest, the level of landowner protest necessary to constitute an interruption of use should differ substantively under these tests.9 6 Under the lost grant theory, a verbal protest
91. See Aldridge, supra note 71, at 292-94.
92. Ingraham, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) at 42-43. A 20-year duration has been required consistently in North Carolina under both the lost grant and adverse possession theories. See Wilson
v. Wilson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 154, 155 (1833).
93. Ingraham, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) at 42-43. To allow evidence proving that a lost grant,

which was merely a fictional construct created by the courts, had never actually existed was
clearly illogical.

94. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 80.
96. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
374 (3d ed. 1989); see Note, Interruption of the Adverse Enjoyment of Easements, 20 HARV. L.
REV. 317, 318 (1907):
[W]hen applied to the adverse enjoyment of incorporeal hereditaments, especially
easements, the idea that non-acquiescence, affratively proved, rebuts the entirely
fictitious legal presumption of a lost grant necessary for title by prescription, seems to
have given "uninterrupted" an entirely distinct meaning. Adverse enjoyment is

"continuous" if, in fact, exercised throughout a period of time; it is "uninterrupted"

if the person whose rights are infringed has in no sufficient manner asserted the

wrongness of the use. The one requirement prescribes the character of the use itself;
the other concerns the attitude, position, or actions, of the injured person.
Id. The author of the Harvard note establishes that under the lost grant theory, the inquiry
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logically defeats the element of passive assent. Under the analogy to adverse possession, however, a verbal protest merely strengthens the proof
that the use was undertaken without the express or implied permission of
the landowner.
Since Ingraham, the North Carolina courts have not attempted to
redefine what constitutes an interruption of prescriptive use, although
cases have established that the erection of a fence with an unlocked gate
does not constitute an interruption. 7 The courts have simply repeated
the statement that any act by the landowner which "would prevent the
full and free enjoyment of the easement" constitutes an interruption of
prescriptive use. 98
The requirement that the claimant must prove "substantial identity
of the easement claimed" has its origins in Speight v. Anderson,9 9 in
which the supreme court affirmed prior cases requiring that use be confined to a "definite and specific line" for a twenty-year period, and established that "[w]hile there may be slight deviations in the line of travel
there must be a substantial identity of the thing enjoyed.''l° In particular, the Speight decision affirmed Cahoon v. Roughton,'0 ' a 1939 case in
which a prescriptive easement over a road leading to a wharf was denied
because the pathway had shifted "as erosion caused by the rains and the
tides made it necessary."'" 2 Recent cases have construed the "substandetermining whether an interruption occurred considered chiefly the action of the landowner;
an interruption occurred if the landowner "asserted the wrongness" of the trespass to a sufficient level to constitute "non-acquiescence." Id. In contrast, the modem doctrine of adverse
possession looks to whether an actual temporal interruption of use occurred, rather than to the
level of landowner objection, to determine whether an interruption occurred. See CUNNINGHAM et al., supra note 70, § 11.7, at 763. Modem prescription theory draws from both: it
requires some overt action by the landowner manifesting intent to interrupt use, but focuses on
the extent to which the landowner succeeds in preventing use rather than on the level of land.
owner objection. E.g., Keefer v. Jones, 467 Pa. 544, 550-51, 359 A.2d 735, 738 (1976); see
supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
97. See Crump v. Mims, 64 N.C. 767, 769-71 (1870); Warmack v. Cooke, 71 N.C. App.
548, 554, 322 S.E.2d 804, 809, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 515, 329 S.E.2d 401 (1984).
98. See, eg., West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 50, 326 S.E.2d 601, 611 (1985); Dickinson v.
Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 581, 201 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1974).
99. 226 N.C. 492, 39 S.E.2d 371 (1946).
100. Id. at 496, 39 S.E.2d at 374; see also Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185,
188, 193 S.E. 153, 155 (1937) ("[T]he travel must be confined to a definite and specific line,
although slight deviations in the line of travel, leaving the road substantially the same, may not
destroy the rights of the public.").
101. 215 N.C. 116, 1 S.E.2d 362 (1939).
102. Id. at 119, 1 S.E.2d at 364. The Cahoon decision is important because it could be cited
for the propositions that substantial deviations to avoid natural obstructions destroy substantial identity and that the character of the land over which the easement is claimed should not
be considered in determining substantial identity. Id. Both propositions were rejected in the
Concerned Citizens opinion. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 48-49, 404 S.E.2d at 683-25.
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tial identity" requirement less strictly. In Oshita v. Hill" the court of
appeals required only a "reasonably definite and specific line [of travel],"
and noted that, "since prescriptive ways are established by custom and
usage rather than by road builders and engineers, a metes and bounds
description is not required; that the way can be located and identified
from the testimony given is sufficient."'"1 4
In West v. Slick 105 the supreme court applied the "substantial identity" test to an easement claimed over the "shifting sands" of North Carolina's barrier islands for the first time."° 6 The claimants in West alleged
that a public prescriptive easement had been perfected over two unimproved roads across a four-mile stretch of Currituck Banks, seven miles
south of the village of Corolla."0 7 All of the land within this four-mile
stretch, from the oceanfront to Currituck Sound, was privately owned. 108
The course of one of the roads had varied somewhat over the years because sand blown across the road had at times blurred its location, and
because travellers had turned off the road to avoid oncoming cars and
areas of the road that had eroded or flooded due to storms. 0 9 Although
it affirmed the Speight and Cahoon decisions, the court held the claimants' evidence sufficient to prove the location of a definite and specific
way over this road because the deviations that had occurred were
"slight" and not "substantial.""' The West court did not state that the
test for "substantial identity" should vary depending on the environment
in which the prescriptive easement is claimed, although this inference
may reasonably be drawn from its application of the substantial identity
element. "'
The requirement that the claimant prove the continuous use of a
reasonably definite route to perfect a prescriptive easement controls in
the majority of states." 2 Courts have upheld the creation of easements
by prescription in situations in which deviation from a single path oc103. 65 N.C. App. 326, 308 S.E.2d 923 (1983).
104. Id. at 329, 308 S.E.2d at 926.
105. 313 N.C. 33, 326 S.E.2d 601 (1985).
106. Id. at 40-45, 326 S.E.2d at 605-08. See generally Shaffer, supra note 74, at 813-14
(analyzing the West decision).
107. West, 313 N.C. at 36-37, 326 S.E.2d at 603-04.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 41-42, 326 S.E.2d at 607-08.
110. Id. at 45, 326 S.E.2d at 608.
111. Id.; see Shaffer, supra note 74, at 823-24.
112. E.g., Krencicki v. Petersen, 22 Ariz. App. 1, 3, 522 P.2d 762, 764 (1974); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 344, at 226; W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Acquisition of Right of Way by
Prescription as Affected by Change of Location or Deviation During PrescriptivePeriod, 80
A.L.R.2D 1095, 1096 (1961).
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curred to avoid natural obstructions,11 3 to avoid man-made obstructions,"' at the request of the landowner,"' or when the deviation was
slight or immaterial in degree." 6 It is clear that slight deviations do not
defeat prescription in North Carolina." 7 It is less clear to what extent
substantial (or not "slight") deviations may defeat prescription. Cahoon
provides authority for the proposition that substantial deviations to avoid
natural obstructions will defeat prescription."' Although West purports
to follow Cahoon, it could be cited for the proposition that deviations to
avoid natural obstructions are not substantial deviations." 9 Before Concerned Citizens, the North Carolina courts had not directly addressed
whether substantial deviations to avoid man-made obstructions destroy
the substantial identity of the easement. The majority of states that have
addressed this issue have held that changes in the course of the path
made to suit the convenience of the landowner do not destroy the identity of the path claimed. 2 ° The cases addressing the requirement of a
definite and specific path generally do not focus on the landowner's intent in creating an obstruction. 2 ' Viewed in this light, there is no difference between a deviation to avoid a fence intended to serve as a barricade
to trespassers and a deviation to avoid a fence intended for agricultural
113. E.g., State ex reL Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n v. Hull, 168 Neb. 805, 825, 97
N.W.2d 535, 547 (1959); Nonken v. Bexar County, 221 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); see M.L. Cross, Annotation, Acquisition of a Right of Way by Prescriptionas Affected by
Change of Location or Deviation DuringPrescriptivePeriod, 143 A.L.R. 1402, 1410-14 (1943);
Dunn, supra note 112, at 1098.
114. Eg., Telford v. Stettmund, 205 Okla. 86, 89, 235 P.2d 692, 694-96 (1951) (holding
that construction of building in path did not defeat prescription where use continued around
building); see Cross, supra note 113, at 1411-14.
115. E.g., Zunino v. Gabriel, 182 Cal. App. 2d 613, 618, 6 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1960); see
Cross, supra note 113, at 1414-17. Some jurisdictions treat changes in the course of a path at
the request of the owner as an abandonment of the path, resetting the prescriptive clock on the
use of another. See Peters v. Little, 95 Ga. 151, 152, 22 S.E. 44, 45 (1894). In any case,
submission to the will of the landowner may be viewed as evidence of permissive use.
116. See, eg., 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 344, at 226; Cross, supra note 113, at 1410;
Dunn, supra note 112, at 1097-98.
117. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
118. See Cahoon v. Roughton, 215 N.C. 116, 119, 1 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1939).
119. See West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 44, 326 S.E.2d, 601, 608 (1985). West does not describe the nature of the natural obstructions that travellers were forced to avoid. The opinion
merely restates testimony of the claimant's witness that there were "bad places" in the track
that drivers were at times forced to avoid. Id.
120. E.g., Cook v. Wimpey, 57 Ga. App. 338, 338, 195 S.E. 325, 325 (1938); Flener v.
Lawrence, 187 Ky. 384, 390, 220 S.W. 1041, 1044 (1920); Faulkner v. Hook, 300 Mo. 135,
139, 254 S.W. 48, 50 (1923); State ex rel. Game, Forestation & Parks Comm'n v. Hull, 168
Neb. 805, 826, 97 N.W.2d 535, 547-48 (1959) (landowner moved gate and road 85 feet);
Fowler v. Matthews, 204 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); see Cross, supra note 113, at
1414-17; Dunn, supra note 112, at 1098-99.
121. See Dunn, supra note 112, at 1098.
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purposes. The question of the landowner's intent, one may fairly conclude, should be limited to the "adverse" and "uninterrupted" elements.
North Carolina courts have not addressed whether changes made in the
course of a path at the request of the landowner defeat the substantial
identity requirement; evidence of such changes, however, would be overwhelming evidence of permissive use.122
Like a growing majority of states,123 North Carolina recognizes that
a public easement may be created by prescriptive use when the nature of
the use throughout the prescriptive period has been sufficiently public to
give the landowner notice that a public easement, and not a mere private
easement, has been claimed. 2 4 Public prescription differs significantly
from private prescription. A private prescriptive easement vests only in
the person or persons who actually used the path for the entire prescriptive period (although tacking among successive users is recognized when
privity of estate, blood, or contract exists).' 25 While a private prescriptive easement may be alienated, the scope of the easement may not exceed the scope of the use by which it was created.' 26 In contrast, a public
prescriptive easement vests in the general public and thus may be used by
persons who never used the path during the prescriptive period.' 2 7 A
public prescriptive easement is much less limited in scope because the use
28
by which the easement was created is deemed to be general public use.1
In theory, the scope of the public prescriptive easement should be limited
to the extent of the use during the prescriptive period; in practice, however, the extent of use of a public prescriptive easement may greatly exceed the extent of use by which the easement was acquired. 2 9 Public
easements also may create a more permanent burden on a landowner
than private easements. While the landowner may negotiate with holders of a private prescriptive easement to repurchase or reroute a private
easement, alteration of a public prescriptive easement requires negotiation with the state and may be either too expensive or impossible to
accomplish.
Because a public easement is less limited in scope and creates a more
permanent encumbrance than a private easement, courts have placed a
122. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
123. E.g., Dillingham Comm. Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 416 (Alaska 1985);
see 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 342, at 209.
124. E.g., West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 41, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1985).
125. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 346, at 247.
126. Id. § 349, at 262.
127. Degnan, supra note 21, at 953.
128. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 342, at 214.
129. Id.
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greater burden on the claimant attempting to prove public prescription. 130 The essential difference is that the claimant of public prescription must prove that the nature and extent of the use has put the
landowner on notice that a right has been claimed by the general public,
and not merely by a group of individuals. 131 In practice, this burden has

been met in most states only when the use is deemed to be identical to
that of a public street or road. 32 A few courts require that the route
over which the easement is claimed have been maintained by public au-

thorities as if it were a public road;133 others require public maintenance
in implied dedication cases, but not in public prescription cases.' 34 In

addition, public prescription can occur only when both ends of the acquired path lie in publicly owned places. 135 The North Carolina courts
have not expressly addressed how the claimant's burden of proof differs
between public and private prescription; as stated, the essential elements
in public and private prescription cases are generally identical. 3 6 The

cases have followed the pattern that public prescription occurs only when
the use resembled the use of a public road and both ends of the road lay
in publicly owned places. 137 Discord exists in the North Carolina case
law concerning the significance of maintenance by public authorities.' 8

In Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen 139 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a public easement could be perfected through prescriptive use only if the claimant could show that municipal or state authorities had undertaken to maintain the roadway."4 This holding has not
130. See Degnan, supra note 21, at 953.
131. Id.
132. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 342, at 211.
133. E.g., Bain v. Fry, 352 Mich. 299, 305, 89 N.W.2d 485, 489 (1958). Connecticut and
New York do not recognize the doctrine of public prescription. See Miller v. Grossman Shoes,
Inc., 186 Conn. 229, 233-34, 404 A.2d 302, 304 (1982); Forest Hills Gardens Corp. v. Baroth,
147 Misc. 2d 404, 408, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
134. E.g., Felder v. Crook, 208 IUl. App. 3d 1012, 1026, 567 N.E.2d 1115, 1125 (1991).
135. See Layman v. Gnegy, 26 Md. App. 114, 117, 337 A.2d 126, 128 (1975); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 343, at 214.
136. Town of Sparta v. Hamm, 97 N.C. App. 82, 86, 387 S.E.2d 173, 176, disc. rev. denied,
326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990).
137. E.g., id. at 87, 387 S.E.2d at 176.
138. See West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 53-57, 326 S.E.2d 601, 612-15 (1985).
139. 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937).
140. Id. at 188, 193 S.E. at 155. The Hemphill court held:
To establish the existence of a road or alley as a public way in the absence of the
laying out by public authority or actual dedication, it is essential not only that there
must be twenty years user under claim of right adverse to the owner, but the road
must have been worked and kept in order by public authority.
Id. Although it is not clear in the language of the Hemphill opinion, it may be argued that
public maintenance is required for the entire prescriptive period. See Scott v. Shackelford, 241
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been expressly overruled; 14 1 it is suspect, however, for the following reasons. Public easements can be created in North Carolina by prescriptive
use and through the doctrine of implied dedication. 42 Under the doctrine of implied dedication, courts find a dedication of a right-of-way to

the public, absent a deed evidencing formal acts of dedication by the
landowner and acceptance by the public authorities, if a dedication and

acceptance can be implied from the conduct of the parties. 43 The claimant by implied dedication must show both clear and unmistakable intent
to dedicate on the part of the landowner and acts evidencing acceptance
on the part of the public authorities. 144 In North Carolina, as in most
states, it has been established that maintenance of the road by the state or
municipal authorities is required to meet the burden of proof of accept145
ance by the public if express, formal acceptance cannot be proved.
N.C. 738, 743, 86 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1955) ("lIlt is not enough for the public to use the streets,
highways or alleys for twenty years. The public authorities must assert control over them.");
Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1944) (every public road or highway must be "established either by the public authorities in a proceeding,] ... or... generally
used by the public and [under the control of] the proper authorities... for the period of twenty
years or moref,] or... dedicated to the public by the owner").
The term "user," rather than "use," was commonly employed in older cases and has been
repeated inconsistently in recent cases. "User" has been defined as "[t]he actual exercise or
enjoyment of any right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (6th ed. 1990). The term is more
specific than "use," particularly in the context of the "adverse" requirement, but is probably
no more accurate; usage of the term appears to be fading. See, eg., Potts v. Burette, 301 N.C.
663, 666, 273 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1981).
141. The question whether public maintenance is an essential element of prescription was
discussed at length in the West opinion. West, 313 N.C. at 59, 326 S.E.2d at 613. The West
court did not resolve the issue, finding instead that the slight public maintenance that did
occur was sufficient to meet any requirement. kd; see Shaffer, supra note 74, at 815-18
(describing the inconsistency among decisions on this issue).
142. See, eg., Nicholas v. Salisbury Hardware & Furniture Co., 248 N.C. 462, 469-72, 103
S.E.2d 837, 842-45 (1958); Town of Sparta v. Harem, 97 N.C. App. 82, 85, 387 S.E.2d 173,
175-76, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990). Older cases often refer to
public prescription as "dedication by adverse user." See; e.g., Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey Co.,
146 N.C. 272, 273-74, 59 S.E. 1012, 1013 (1907). Apparently, the terms are synonymous. See
Draper v. Conner & Walters Co., 187 N.C. 18, 20-21, 121 S.E. 29, 30-31 (1924).
143. Nicholas, 248 N.C. at 468, 103 S.E.2d at 842; Draper,187 N.C. at 21, 121 S.E. at 3031; Town of Sparta, 97 N.C. App. at 85, 387 S.E.2d at 175.
144. Nicholas, 248 N.C. at 468-69, 103 S.E.2d at 842; Milliken v. Denny, 141 N.C. 193,
197, 53 S.E. 867, 869 (1906). The Milliken court explained that
[t]he acts and declarations of the landowner indicating the intent to dedicate his land
to public use, must be unmistakable in their purpose and decisive in their character
to have that effect.... [Tihey must be such acts as are inconsistent and irreconcilable
with any construction except the assent of the owner of such dedication.
Id.
145. See Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 515-16, 112 S.E.2d 102, 107 (1960);
Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 368, 90 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1956) (stating that public
maintenance and control are one way of proving acceptance, but implying that other ways also
exist); Scott v. Shackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 743, 86 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1955) (holding that public
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The doctrines of implied dedication and public prescription are
clearly distinguishable. Implied dedication focuses on the landowner's
intent to donate an interest in land to public use and the intent of public

authorities to accept that donation. In public prescription, the focus is
on the activity of the actual users and the degree to which a manifest

intent to claim a property right contrary to the landowner's interest existed. The landowner's intent is considered only to determine whether
the use was permissive or adverse; the landowner's intent to dedicate is

irrelevant. Similarly, because offer and acceptance are not required for
prescription, the intent of the public authorities is also irrelevant. The

actions (but not the intent) of public authorities in maintaining a road
may, however, be crucial to the determination of whether the use was

adverse or whether the landowner was given adequate notice that the
interest claimed throughout the prescriptive period was claimed by the
general public and not by a group of individuals.

Although the common-law rules relating to implied dedication and
public prescription in North Carolina were clearly distinguished as early

as 1844,14 the courts have at times confused the two doctrines, stating
that conduct meeting the requirements of implied dedication creates a
presumption of a lost grant to the public, 147 or requiring twenty years of
continuous use to prove implied dedication.' 48 A result of this confusion

is that maintenance and control by public authorities, which are essential
elements of implied dedication, have also been required in some public
prescription cases.14 9 Several decisions, however, have recognized that

maintenance by public authorities is not an essential element of public
prescription, but may be necessary in some cases to prove other essential
road acquired by implied dedication must be one "dedicated to the public by the owner of the
soil with the sanction of the [public] authorities andfor the maintenance and operation of which
they are responsible") (citing Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1944)),
Jeffress v. Town of Greenville, 154 N.C. 490, 493, 70 S.E. 919, 920 (1911); Boyden v. Achenbach, 79 N.C. 539, 541 (1878).
146. State v. Marble, 26 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 318, 320 (1844). The Marble court recognized
that the requirement of 20 years of continuous use was applicable only to public prescription,
and not to implied dedication, because "it is rather the intention of the owner than the length
of time of the user which must determine the fact of the dedication." Id.
147. State v. Norris, 174 N.C. 808, 808, 93 S.E. 950, 951 (1917) (public highways include
those that have "been used and kept up by the public for such a period of time that the law will
presume a dedication to the public use").
148. State v. Johnson, 33 N.C. (11 Ired. Eq.) 647, 650-51 (1850) (presumption of dedication where "the public had used [the claimed path] as a road, and the County Court had so
recognized it, by the appointment of overseers and hands to keep it in repairfortwenty years,
which is the shortest time").
149. Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 909 (1944); Hemphill v. Board
of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 188, 193 S.E. 153, 155 (1937).
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elements of public prescription. 5 ° As a result of this inconsistent treatment in the case law, the West court held that "public maintenance is
either to be considered as evidence of adverse use of a road by the public,
or as an essential element, the showing of which must be established in
order to establish a public road by prescription." 15' While the North
Carolina courts have clearly articulated the reasoning behind the requirement of public maintenance to prove implied dedication,1 52 the cases provide no express justification for the requirement of public maintenance in
53
prescription.1
Although the public prescription doctrine has traditionally been applied only to roads or streets, four coastal states have applied the doctrine to the dry-sand area of ocean beaches.' 54 In Seaway Co. v. Attorney

General,'5 5 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that a public prescrip-

150. Wright v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 616, 617-18, 158 S.E. 99, 100 (1931).
Wright addresses the following passage in Boyden v. Achenbach, 79 N.C. 539 (1878), which
has proved problematic over the years:
It is not however intended to be denied that where the public has used a way as a
public road or cartway just as if it had been laid off by order of Court-as if it has
had an overseer and hands and been worked and kept in order-for more than
twenty years, it will be presumed that it was so laid off or that the owner of the land
had dedicated it to the public; but the mere user offootpaths and neighborhood roads
without such accompanying circumstances will raise no such presumption however
long the time.
Id. at 541. Whereas the Hemphill and Chesson courts interpreted this sentence as requiring the
circumstance of public maintenance ("an overseer and hands") for both implied dedication
and prescription, the Wright court suggested that public maintenance was required for implied
dedication but was merely evidence of adverse use in public prescription cases. Wright, 200
N.C. at 617, 158 S.E. at 100; see Haggard v. Mitchell, 180 N.C. 255, 261, 104 S.E. 561, 564
(1920) (holding that public prescription may occur when "the occupation is so general and of
such a kind as to permit the inference and appri[s]e the owner that the public has assumed
control of his property and is exercising it as a matter of right," and stating that public maintenance is not essential); State v. Fisher, 117 N.C. 733, 738, 23 S.E. 158, 158 (1895) ("the best
evidence of [adverse use in the case of public prescription] is the fact that the proper authorities
have appointed overseers and designated hands to work, and assumed for the public the responsibility of keeping the way in repair") (emphasis added).
151. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 56, 326 S.E.2d 601, 614 (1985).
152. E.g., Oliver v. Ernul, 277 N.C. 591, 598, 178 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1971) ("A dedication
without acceptance is merely a revocable offer and . . . 'neither burdens nor benefits with
attendant duties may be imposed on the public unless in some proper way it has consented to
assume them.' ") (quoting Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 317, 128 S.E.2d 583, 586 (1962)).
153. See Chesson, 224 N.C. at 291,29 S.E.2d at 909; Hemphill, 212 N.C. at 188, 193 S.E. at
155.
154. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171
(1970) (using implied dedication doctrine, but in a manner similar to the public prescription
doctrine); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974); State ex
rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 594, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969); Moody v. White, 593
S.W.2d 372, 377-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
155. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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tive easement could be created over the area extending from the mean
high tide line to the first line of stable vegetation when the entire beach
had been used by the public for vehicular and pedestrian travel, fishing,
camping, swimming, and sunbathing.15 6 Seaway established that the natural boundaries of the beach, the water and the first line of stable vegetation, were sufficient to delineate a definite route similar in nature to15a7
public road and therefore sufficient to prove public prescription.
Although the court relied heavily on the use of the beach as a route of
vehicular travel, the easement created in the public the right to use the
beach for general recreational purposes and not solely as a travel
route.15 8 The Seaway court also expressly recognized that a strong public policy supports preserving the public right to use ocean beaches.15 9 A
1986 case, Feinman v. State,16" expanded the Seaway analysis, holding
that a public prescriptive easement over the dry-sand beach was not absolutely tied to a specific location, but moved landward and seaward as
the beach eroded and accreted.'6 1 Were this "rolling easement" concept
not recognized, a public prescriptive easement over the dry-sand beach
would disappear as the beach eroded.
Public interests in the dry-sand beach also have been created
through three other common-law doctrines: implied dedication, 161 custom,16 3 and the public trust." The California and Texas courts have
allowed the creation of a public easement in the dry-sand beach by implied dedication.165 In Texas, the implied dedication doctrine is similar
to implied dedication in North Carolina, requiring evidence of the landowner's intent to dedicate to public use and of acceptance by public authorities manifested by public maintenance and control of the acquired
land. 166 In California, implied dedication takes two forms. The first is
the traditional form similar to North Carolina's common law of implied
156. Id at 939.
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id.
160. 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
161. Id. at 108-11.
162. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171
(1970); Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 930.
163. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (D.V.I.
1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Ashford, 50 Haw. 314, 316-17, 440 P.2d 76,
77-78 (1968); State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969).
164. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 332, 471 A.2d 355, 365, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See generally Finnell, supra note 16, at 640-43 (discussing the
public trust doctrine and application of the doctrine by the New Jersey Supreme Court).
165. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 43, 465 P.2d at 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 171; Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 930.
166. Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 935-36.
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dedication; the second, which has been labeled "dedication by adverse
use," 167 more closely resembles public prescription. 168 The California
cases allowing acquisition of an easement in the dry-sand beach relied on
1 69
the latter form.
The Oregon Supreme Court, which has acknowledged that a public
easement in the dry-sand beach can be perfected through public prescription, 170 has relied on the common-law doctrine of custom to establish
that the public holds an easement for general recreational and commercial use over the dry-sand beach on all beaches of the state. 17 Recognizing an urgent public policy need to preserve public access to oceanfront
beaches,' 72 the Oregon court noted a critical drawback to the public prescription doctrine: prescription requires substantial litigation because a
case-by-case analysis of each stretch of beach is demanded. 73 As California's experience showed, the prescription doctrine may also encourage
landowners to go to great lengths to keep the public off their land in
order to interrupt prescriptive use; such a result may close more beaches
to public use than it opens.' 74 The custom doctrine holds that a customary use may achieve the status of law if "continued from time immemorial, without interruption, and as of right; it must be certain as to the
place, and as to the persons; and it must be certain and reasonable as to
the subject matter or rights created." 17 Commentators have unearthed
no application of the custom doctrine in the common law of North
Carolina.

176

The final method of creating a public interest in dry-sand beach was
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Assn.'17 7 The New Jersey court rejected the doctrines of
public prescription, implied dedication, and custom as "[a]rchaic judicial
responses" to the modem conflict between the expectations of oceanfront
landowners and those of the general public. 178 The Matthews court re167. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 38, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68.
168. See County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 567, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 769 (1976).
169. Gion, 2 Cal. 3d at 37-44, 465 P.2d at 56-58, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 167-70.
170. State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 594, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969).
171. Id at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
172. Id at 588-91, 462 P.2d at 673-75.
173. Id at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
174. See Carmichael, supra note 11, at 170 (describing the "ironic aftermath of Gion").
175. Id. at 173.
176. Id at 174-75.
177. 95 N.J. 306, 332, 471 A.2d 355, 365, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
178. Id. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365.
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lied on the public trust doctrine, 179 a common-law doctrine Which,
although applied differently in each state,18 0 generally provides that title
to lands under tidal waters and some navigable rivers is vested inalienably in the state, in trust for the benefit of its citizens. 181 The public trust
doctrine is a broad area of property law that has expanded rapidly during
recent decades; a flexible judicial tool, the courts have found the doctrine
applicable to many natural resources, including inland streams and
82
parks.1
The public trust doctrine concerns two unique property interests:
ownership and public trust rights. In North Carolina, title to lands beneath ocean waters between the mean high tide line and the seaward
limit of state jurisdiction is vested inalienably in the state by virtue of the
public trust doctrine.1 8 3 The ownership aspect of the doctrine ends at the
mean high tide line; although the state may hold title to the entire beach
in fee, title to real property landward of the mean high tide line is not
derived from the public trust. 84 The second property interest created by
the public trust doctrine concerns the rights that accrue to the general
public by virtue of the public trust. These rights differ in each state, but
generally include the right to navigate for commercial or recreational
purposes, fish, swim, hunt, and enjoy other recreation.18 5 These rights
generally attach only to submerged lands in which the state holds title by
virtue of the public trust. In some circumstances, however, privately
held lands may be subject to public trust rights. The Matthews court
held that the privately held dry-sand beach is subject to some public trust
rights for the simple reason that without some right to use the dry-sand
beach, the public's public trust rights in the foreshore are virtually mean179. Id
180. For a description of the states' varying applications of this doctrine, see

DAVID C.
SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE APPLICATION OF
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WATERS AND LIVING

RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES at xv-xxxiii (1990).

181. See Valerie B. Spalding, The Pearlin the Oyster: The Public Trust Doctrine in North
Carolina, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 23, 30-33 (1989) (discussing Magna Carta grant of sovereign
rights in tidal lands and resources up to the high water mark).
182. E.g., Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 293-94 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (extending public trust to national park land); see SLADE et al., supra note 180, at xvxxxiii; Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A FundamentalDoctrineofAmerican Property
Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516-19 (1989). A complete analysis of the public trust doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Note; accordingly, this discussion considers only the application of
the doctrine to the ocean and oceanfront beaches.
183. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(a) (1990); Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of
Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 302, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970).
184. See Spalding, supra note 181, at 63.
185. Mark Cheung, Dockominiums: An Expansion of the Riparian Rights That Violates the
Public Trust Doctrine, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 821, 835 (1989).
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ingless. 1s6 Matthews found two interests created by the public trust doctrine: the right to cross the dry-sand beach in order to reach the
foreshore and the right to use the dry-sand for general recreational purposes, including sunbathing."8 7 The court significantly limited these interests in two ways. First, the rights exist only on those beaches where
circumstances make public use of the dry-sand reasonably necessary. 88
Second, the rights remain "subject to the accommodation of the interests
of the owner" of the dry-sand.189
The complex development of the public trust doctrine in North Carolina has been ably traced in previous articles. 190 This discussion, therefore, concerns only the application of the doctrine to beach access issues.
North Carolina has recognized the public trust doctrine and its application to tidal waters for as long as it has been a state.'9 Similarly, it is
settled law that title to the foreshore is vested in the state and that the
general public possesses the right to use the foreshore for recreational
purposes by virtue of the public trust doctrine. 192 Commentators suggest
that public trust rights can exist in submerged lands held in private ownership under some circumstances in North Carolina. 193 Although recent
cases have recognized the continuing validity of the public trust doctrine
and demonstrate that the rights guaranteed to the public by the doctrine
are expanding, 194 the North Carolina courts have not yet considered the
application of the public trust doctrine to the dry-sand beach. A 1987
186. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323, 471 A.2d 355, 364, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); see also Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877-78 (R.I. 1991)
(holding that an area of dry-sand beach created by beach nourishment is subject to public trust
rights).
187. Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322-23, 471 A.2d at 363-64; see Carmichael, supra note 11, at
182.
188. Matthews, 95 N.J. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365.
189. Id; see Anne Conley-Pitchell, The Public May Have a Right to Use Privately Owned
Beachesfor Recreation But the Extent ofAny Such Right Will Be Determinedby a Location by
Location Test, 15 RUTGEPS L.J. 813, 823-32 (1984); Carmichael, supra note 11, at 180-83.
190. See Monica K. Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle to PreserveNorh Carolina'sEstuafine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claimsto EstuarineMarshes, Denialof Permits to
Fill,and the Public Trust, 64 N.C. L. REv. 565, 572-86 (1986); David A. Rice, EstuarineLand
of North Carolina: LegalAspect of Ownership, Use and Control,46 N.C. L. REv. 779, 795-802
(1968); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 11-15 (1972); Spalding, supra note 181, at 46-62; Carmichael, supranote 11, at 175-79.
191. See Spalding, supra note 181, at 46.
192. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 302, 177
S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970).
193. See Kalo & Kalo, supra note 190, at 571.
194. See, eg., State ex reL Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 532, 369 S.E.2d 825, 831 (1988)
(acknowledging public trust doctrine for lands under public waters); State v. Forehand, 67
N.C. App. 148, 150-51, 312 S.E.2d 247, 249, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 307, 317 S.E.2d 904
(1984).
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opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court, however, hinted that
some public trust rights do exist in the dry-sand beach.t 95 A 1991 federal
case, decided after Concerned Citizens, held that the value of public trust
rights may not be used by the Internal Revenue Service to diminish the
charitable deduction allowable to a North Carolina taxpayer when the
taxpayer donates a strip of dry-sand beach to a municipality, but conceded that "the extent to which the public trust doctrine applies to dry
sand property in North Carolina is an unsettled question."19' 6 Several
North Carolina statutes suggest that the public possesses rights of access
195. In Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987), the supreme
court addressed the issue whether a statute prohibiting vehicular travel on one part of an
oceanfront beach, but not on another, constituted an "exclusive emolument" prohibited by the
North Carolina Constitution because the statute benefitted only the landowners on the restricted beach, and not those on the unrestricted beach. Id. at 651-52, 360 S.E.2d at 763-64.
In restating the plaintiffs' argument, Justice Frye wrote:

rr]he act grants the oceanfront property owners within Blocks 51 thru 54 a special
privilege or exclusive emolument in that they do not have the use and enjoyment of
their oceanfront property infringed upon or restricted by the public's right to use
motor vehicles on the public trustportions of such property.
Id.at 652, 360 S.E.2d at 764 (emphasis added). This statement, while probably not essential to
the opinion, clearly implies that the general public possesses some rights of access in the beach
by virtue of the public trust doctrine and that these rights exist in the dry-sand beach because
this is the only part of the beach that oceanfront property owners can own. See Brief for
Appellant-Intervenor at 16, Concerned Citizens (No. 8813-SC-1075).
196. Cooper v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 833, 835 (E.D.N.C. 1991). In Cooper a taxpayer conveyed shares of stock in a corporation, the only asset of which was a stretch of beach
property bounded by a seawall and the mean high tide line, to the town of Atlantic Beach. Id.
The IRS challenged the amount of the charitable deduction taken by the taxpayer on the
theory that the taxpayer had not possessed a sufficient bundle of property rights to justify the
value reported either because the property was subject to public trust rights or because the
property had previously been dedicated to the town. Id. Finding no prior dedication, the court
reasoned that, because issues involving the application of the public trust doctrine to the drysand have remained unsettled by the judiciary, North Carolina General Statutes § 77-20,
which establishes the mean high tide line as the oceanward boundary of private property in
North Carolina, should control. Ia; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20 (1990).
Although the court was probably right to find for the taxpayer, this reasoning is suspect.
Section 77-20 merely precludes the extension of private property rights oceanward of the mean
high tide line; it does not limit public rights landward of the mean high tide line in any way.
See id.In addition, the existence of public trust rights was arguably irrelevant in Cooper. Even
if public trust rights did exist, the taxpayer possessed a transferable property interest. The
value of this interest for tax purposes is its fair market value. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c) (as
amended in 1990). Fair market value considers the highest price a willing buyer would pay for
the property rights held, regardless of the quantum of ownership, and is generally determined
by comparison to sales of similar properties. Ia § 1.170A-1(c)(2). Because the public trust
doctrine must apply to all North Carolina ocean beaches identically, if at all, the existence of
public trust rights is irrelevant to the determination of value of one stretch of beach. The court
implicitly acknowledged this point by limiting its holding to the conclusion that the taxpayer
owned the dry-sand beach prior to the gift, granting a partial summary judgment for the taxpayer and reserving valuation questions for later proceedings. Cooper, 779 F. Supp. at 836.
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to the entirety of the oceanfront beach.197 Finally, some have argued
that the North Carolina Constitution, which establishes that it is a
proper function of the state to preserve the ocean beaches "as a part of
the common heritage of the state,"19' 8 implicates public trust rights.1 99

Despite the references to public trust rights in oceanfront beaches
adopted by the North Carolina Legislature, one commentator has stated
that the public trust doctrine is a purely aquatic doctrine in North Carolina and has suggested that an expansion to the dry-sand beach is not
foreseeable. 2°°
The history of the common-law doctrines that govern public beach
access in North Carolina reveals great uncertainty. This uncertainty has
exacerbated the current conflict between the expectations of oceanfront
property owners and those of the beach-going public. The unusual facts
of Concerned Citizens gave the supreme court the opportunity to untangle legal issues relating to both the perpendicular and lateral access issues. Before discussing the extent to which the court succeeded in this
197. Section 1-45.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which prohibits adverse possession of public trust lands, defines public trust rights as follows:
"[P]ublic trust rights" means those rights held in trust by the State for the use and
benefit of the people of the State in common. They are established by common law as
established by the courts of this State. They include, but are not limited to, the right
to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the watercourses
of the State and the right to freely use and enjoy the State's ocean and estuarine
beaches.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Section 160A-308 restricts the
power of municipalities to prohibit the use of vehicles for commercial fishing activities on the
"foreshore, beach strand and barrier dune system." Id. § 160A-308 (1987). Section 113A134.1 establishes the public policy goals underlying North Carolina's beach access program
(which focuses on perpendicular beach access), and notes that "[tihe ocean and estuarine
beaches are resources of statewide significance and have been customarily freely used and enjoyed by people throughout the State." Id § 113A-134.1 (1989). While none of these statutes
actually creates a public interest in the dry-sand beach, each implies that some such interest
exists. Brief for Appellant-Intervenor at 19-20, Concerned Citizens (No. 8813-SC-1075).
198. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
199. The plaintiffs in Concerned Citizens argued that the North Carolina Supreme Court
implicitly equated "public trust rights" with the "common heritage" language used in article
XIV, § 5 when it stated in State ex rel Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988),
that this constitutional provision "mandates the conservation and protection of public lands
and waters for the benefit of the public." Brief for Appellant-Intervenor at 18, Concerned
Citizens (No. 8813-SC-1075) (citing Credle, 322 N.C. at 532, 369 S.E.2d at 831). To support
this argument, the plaintiffs relied on § 146-6(0 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which
provides that when widened beaches are created by beach nourishment projects, the entire area
of the nourished beach "shall remain open to the free use and enjoyment of the people of the
State, consistent with public trust rights in ocean beaches, which rights are part of the common
heritage of the people of this State." Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(0 (1991)).
200. Spalding, supra note 181, at 64.
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untangling, it is necessary to analyze the court's treatment of the public
prescription doctrine.
In determining the level of landowner objection that constitutes an
interruption of prescriptive use, the Concerned Citizens court faced a
question of first impression. The Ingraham decision, which has been
cited as the dispositive case on the issue of landowner interruption in
North Carolina for more than a century,2 "° is simply not relevant to a
prescription theory based on an analogy to the statute of limitations in
adverse possession. The elements of "peaceable" use and "passive assent" to the use by the landowner--essential to the lost grant theoryare inconsistent with the adverse possession theory, which requires
neither "peaceable" use nor "passive assent" and places greater emphasis
on the requirement that the use be notoriously adverse to the landowner's interest. 20 2 The test adopted in Concerned Citizensi which requires intent to interrupt use, overt acts towards that end, and actual
success in preventing use for some substantial period of time in order to
constitute an interruption of prescriptive use, places North Carolina in
line with the majority of states. 203 The fact that the North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted a majority position on prescriptive acquisition
may itself be significant, indicating a shift from the court's traditional
distrust of the prescription doctrine. The application of this test to the
facts in Concerned Citizens makes the test particularly noteworthy.
The critical question under the interruption test adopted in Concerned Citizens, as in the majority of states, is how long use must be
interrupted to constitute a "substantial interruption." The Concerned
Citizens opinion and the majority of cases in other states make it clear
that, under the majority rule, a brief interruption, for a few minutes or
hours, is not sufficient to interrupt prescriptive use.2° 4 The author has
201. E.g., Annotation, supra note 90, at 1325-26.
202. See supra text accompanying note 96.
203. See cases cited supra note 86. The opinion does not make clear whether the "actual
and substantial interruption" test adopted in Concerned Citizens requires that the landowner
intend to interrupt use. See Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 51-54, 404 S.E.2d at 686-88.
Intent to interrupt was clearly evident from the facts, and, consistent with the adverse possession theory, the court was concerned less with the landowner's state of mind than with the
physical cessation of use. Id. The theoretical basis for the requirement of intent to interrupt
use is that intent, manifested in actions taken towards that end, distinguishes an interruption of
use caused by the landowner from a mere lapse of continuous use caused by the whim of the
user. This distinction is important only if the length of time required to constitute a "substantial interruption" and that required to prove a lapse of continuous use differ significantly.
204. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 687; see South Norwalk Lodge v.
Palco Hats, 140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953); Lofiand v. Truitt, 260 A.2d 909,
912 (Del. Ch. 1969); Trustees of Forestgreen Estates v. Minton, 510 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Mo.
1974).
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uncovered no case, however, in which an actual interruption lasting more
than a few days was not held to be a substantial interruption.2 "° In addition, several cases indicate that a ritual interruption of use occurring for
one day every year or every few years does constitute a substantial interruption.2 "6 Thus, it appears that under the majority rule an actual interruption for more than a few days, during a time in which the road would
have been used were it not for the landowner's efforts to obstruct use,
constitutes a substantial interruption.
It is difficult to determine from the Concerned Citizens opinion to
what degree the developer actually succeeded in interrupting use, because the court merely summarized the conflicting evidence presented by
the parties and rejected the findings of fact by the trial court as unsupported by the evidence.20 7 However, the tone of the opinion, which recognizes that the developer met with "varying degrees of success" 20 s in
interrupting use over the twenty-year period, suggests that a period of
interruption much longer than a few days is necessary to constitute an
actual interruption. The opinion quotes testimony by an employee of the
developer stating that a gate would remain standing for a varying period
of time until someone driving a four-wheel drive vehicle would get angry
enough to demolish it.20 9 Rather than focusing on whether the period of
time prior to the destruction of the gate was sufficient to constitute a
substantial interruption, the court relied heavily on the level of defiance
exhibited when the gates were demolished as grounds for reversing the
trial court's findings of fact.2 10
The Concerned Citizens court also failed to distinguish adequately
between a lapse in continuous use caused by the whim of the users and an
interruption forced by the actions of the landowner.2 11 It is well established that a long lapse in use during bad weather months does not destroy the continuous element of prescription when the nature of the use is
recreational and seasonal.21 2 This fact has no bearing, however, on the
205. See O'Connor v. Beale, 143 Me. 387, 391-92, 62 A.2d 870, 872-73 (1948) (finding an
interruption when landowner placed sawhorses with an attached "No Trespassing" sign across
road and the sawhorses remained in place for at least one week); George v. Crosno, 254
S.W.2d 30, 35 (Miss. App. 1952) (finding use interrupted when landowner continually maintained locked gate despite fact that claimant frequently broke lock and used path).
206. See Talbot's, Inc. v. Cessnun Enters., 566 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Alaska 1977);
Stiegelman v. Pennsylvania Yacht Club, 432 Pa. 111, 117, 246 A.2d 116, 119-20 (1968).
207. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 39, 404 S.E.2d at 679.
208. Id at 43, 404 S.E.2d at 681.
209. Id. at 50, 404 S.E.2d at 685.
210. Id. at 51, 404 S.E.2d at 686.
211. Id. at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 687.
212. See 2 THOMPsON, supra note 6, § 347, at 249-50.
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length of time necessary to constitute an interruption if the landowner
undertakes to interrupt use at a time when use would occur but for the
landowner's actions.2 13
The court's treatment of the substantial interruption question also
raises questions pertaining to a claimant's burden of proof. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently held that the claimant bears the
burden of proving each essential element of the prescription doctrine,
including the uninterrupted use element.2 14 This view suggests that a
claimant must provide affirmative evidence that users were never actually
prevented from using a path for any substantial period of time; the claimant's burden should be particularly great when a landowner has
presented undisputed evidence that many barriers were constructed and
maintained with the intent of interrupting use. While the court did not
address the claimant's burden of proof, the opinion implies that the burden is slight, and that the landowner must prove that use has been interrupted.2 1 5 In addition, findings of fact by a trial court, even when a jury
trial has been waived, are conclusive on appeal unless there is no evidence to support them, even though the evidence presented might sustain
findings to the contrary. 2 6 Given only the evidence presented in the majority opinion, it is difficult to conceive how the trial court's findings of
fact could not survive this deferential review. The Concerned Citizens
court's decision to reject the trial court's findings of fact on the interruption issue evinced the court's interest in preserving public beach access.
The Concerned Citizens substantial interruption test also raises the
question of how many people must be prevented from using the path to
constitute an interruption of public prescriptive use. The opinion indicates that use by all members of the general public, and not just a large
portion of the public, must be interrupted to constitute a significant interruption.217 An alternative view would be to look only to the use by persons who were never actually prevented from using the road and
determine whether their use was sufficient to give the landowner notice
that a public easement was being claimed; if it was not, then a private
easement could be created for the benefit of those persons whose use was
not interrupted.
For these reasons, the Concerned Citizens opinion makes it much
213. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
214. Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 666, 273 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1981).
215. One of the claimant's own witnesses in Concerned Citizens testified he turned around
whenever he went to the eastern end of the subdivision road and found the developer's gates
locked and standing. Record at 95, Concerned Citizens (No. 85-CVS-634).
216. Blackwell v. Butts, 278 N.C. 615, 619, 180 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1971).
217. See Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 51-55, 404 S.E.2d at 686-88.
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more difficult for a landowner to interrupt prescriptive use in North Carolina than in other states. From a public policy perspective, this result
can be viewed as encouraging property owners to invest in more effective
barricades and fences; it may even lead some property owners to resort to
threats or acts of violence to protect their property. Similarly, the holding may encourage members of the public to disregard signs and barriers
and trespass on private lands, although it is doubtful that an average
trespasser has in mind a twenty-year process of prescriptive acquisition
when ignoring a "No Trespassing" sign. The Concerned Citizens decision also could be viewed as discouraging landowners from relying on
physical barriers as a means of interrupting prescription, encouraging
them instead to pursue lawsuits in order to interrupt prescriptive use.
Such a result may be more peaceable, but may be expensive for the landowner. Moreover, a judgment of trespass against a few individuals may
not be deemed sufficient to interrupt prescriptive use against the entire
public, and may actually serve as evidence of adverse use. 2 18 Some states
have adopted procedures by which a landowner may record a notice stating that public use is by permission.2 19 Such a remedy may not be helpful to landowners trying to prevent all use, rather than just prescriptive
use, because it may create a license in the public that is revocable only by
voiding the recorded document; to prevent prescriptive acquisition, a
landowner would have to open his land to the public. Thus, one foreseeable result of the Concerned Citizens decision may be the adoption of a
statutory means of interrupting public prescriptive use, perhaps by establishing that an action to quiet title in a landowner can interrupt public
prescription when frequent users of the path, the municipality, and the
state are given notice of the action and the opportunity to contest. Not
only would such a statute forestall landowners' incentive to barricade
private ways by providing a more certain, albeit more expensive, method
of interrupting use, but it would also hasten the resolution of prescriptive
claims.
The relaxation of the "substantial identity of the easement claimed"
element, from requiring "a definite and specific line of travel," to demanding only "substantial identity of a definite and specific line" sufficient to give the landowner notice of the extent of the adverse claim, is a
218. In State ex rel Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979), the court held
public prescriptive use to have been interrupted when the landowner had several people removed from his property by the police. Id at 148, 594 P.2d 1101. It is unclear whether the
same conclusion would be reached in North Carolina.
219. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 813 (West 1982); Larry L. Teply & Richard L. Williams, Comment, Interruptionof Prescriptive Use: A Prescriptionfor Prescription,25 U. FLA. L. REv. 204,
208-11 (1972); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-38 (West 1986) (providing that interruption may be achieved by serving notice on users in accordance with statute).
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significant change in North Carolina common law.2 2 ° Unlike the change
in the standard for interruption of use, however, this change was readily
foreseeable. West and Oshahitaindicated that the requirement of a definite and specific line of travel was being relaxed, in that both cases found
"slight" deviations that would have been held "substantial" under earlier
case law.22 1 Thus, in Concerned Citizens the court merely achieved in
form what it had accomplished in substance in West. The majority opinion in Concerned Citizens identified two justifications for the substantial
identity requirement: (1) to enable the court to determine with reasonable specificity the location of the easement claimed, and (2) to assure
that the landowner was given notice "not only of the adverse claim, but
of the extent of it as well." 22' 2 Following Concerned Citizens, the North
Carolina courts probably will not apply the substantial identity element
mechanically, as they have at times in the past, but will look to whether
these underlying concerns have been satisfied.
The requirement that the character of the land be considered in determining whether an easement has substantially retained its identity is
reasonable. Courts have long placed differing burdens of proof on the
claimant attempting to prove adverse use, depending on whether the
easement claimed crossed developed or undeveloped land.2 23 One purpose of the substantial identity requirement, in addition to those articulated by the court, is to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the
parties.2 24 Such expectations should differ markedly from the norm in an
oceanfront environment, where finding the exact location of a pedestrian
beach access may be a virtual impossibility following a hurricane or
storm surge. Deviations in a path to avoid natural obstructions already
may have been considered "slight" under West. 225 By holding that such
changes do not, as a matter of law, defeat prescriptive acquisition, the
court joined the view held in the majority of states.2 26
The Concerned Citizens court also joined the majority view in hold220. See supra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.

221. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 44-45, 326 S.E.2d 601, 608 (1985); Oshahita v. Hill, 65
N.C. App. 326, 329, 308 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1983); see Shaffer, supra note 74, at 813-14.

222. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 47, 404 S.E.2d at 683; see also Shaffer, supra note 74,
at 824 ("The function of the identity requirement is essentially to insure proper notice to the
landowner.").
223. See CUNNNGHAM et al., supra note 70, § 8.7, at 454 (noting that public use of "unen-

closed, unoccupied" land may be deemed permissive, or public prescription may be disallowed
on such lands).
224. See Margit Livingston, PublicAccess to Virginia's Tidelands: A Frameworkfor Analysis of Implied Dedications and Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 669, 675-76

(1983).
225. West, 313 N.C. at 44, 326 S.E.2d at 608.
226. See authorities cited in supra note 113.
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ing that deviations to suit the convenience of the owner do not destroy
the substantial identity of the easement claimed.2 2 7 The application of
this rule in Concerned Citizens, however, is somewhat unusual. When
the developer constructed the subdivision road, the course of travel over
the entire property shifted by a distance ranging from zero to 200 feet;
thus, an entirely new path was created.zz It is not clear from the facts of
the case whether the public abandoned the winding sand road and began
using the new road simply because the new road was more convenient or
because the construction of the new development made use of the old
road difficult or impossible. If the former is true, the court's logic was
flawed because it was the convenience of the users, and not of the landowner, that prompted the shift; thus, the argument could be made that a
new prescriptive period began when the public shifted to the new road.
If the latter is true, then the court's analysis was correct.
To understand the significance of the Concerned Citizens substantial
identity test, it is necessary to consider the application of the test to each
of the three unique areas the path crossed. The use of the land between
the entrance to the subdivision and the eastern edge of the overwash,
which has been characterized as a typical sand road, was virtually identical in nature to the use described in West. The court's treatment of this
area did not bring about any significant change in the law outside the
context of changes in location made for the convenience of the landowner. The same conclusion cannot be reached for the other two areas.
The next section of the road, which crosses the "1954 overwash,"
presents a unique set of issues. For at least half of the prescriptive period, the use crossed a low, wide, sandy beach created when the overwash
event destroyed the dunes. Thus, for much of the prescriptive period the
use crossed land substantially similar to the dry-sand beach. 22 9 The nature of the use of the overwash was not limited to direct passage across
the sands; this area also was used for general recreation and vehicular
access to the foreshore at low tide. By the time the subdivision road was
constructed, the shoreline had accreted to the extent that the entire subdivision road lay landward of the first line of stable vegetation. Thus, in
this section, although prescriptive use first began over the overwash/drysand beach, the easement claimed ran over the upland. To further complicate matters, the plaintiff's claim in Concerned Citizens expressly included a public easement over only the subdivision road, 30 but implicitly
included a right of access from the road to the beach at the overwash
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra note 115.
Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 44, 404 S.E.2d at 682.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 42, 404 S.E.2d at 680-81.
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area and at the inlet. The court expressly addressed only the claim to the
subdivision road, but acknowledged that the sole reason for the action
was to assure access to the inlet and the beach.2 31 Because the Concerned
Citizens court merely reversed the trial court on the substantial identity
question and rejected the trial court's findings of fact, the court did not
state whether substantial identity could be proved over the entire
overwash area, over a path leading from the subdivision road to the current dry-sand beach, or merely over the subdivision road.2 32
In explaining how the substantial identity test should be applied,
however, the court relied on two Texas prescription cases, Feinman v.
State 233 and Seaway Co. v. Attorney General,2 34 and noted that the concept of the public "rolling easement" in the dry-sand beach developed in
these cases was consistent with the concept of substantial identity in
North Carolina.2 35 Feinman and Seaway are lateral beach access cases
considering solely the dry-sand beach. 236 The Concerned Citizens court's
reliance on these cases suggests that substantial identity could be proved
by evidence that substantial identity existed over the dry-sand beach
prior to the construction of the subdivision road. It suggests that the fact
that use then shifted to the road did not destroy substantial identity because the change was made for the convenience of the landowner. Under
this theory, a path from the subdivision road to the dry-sand at the
overwash also could be prescribed because it too constituted a change in
location of use made for the convenience of the landowner. The chief
significance of this analysis is that, like Seaway, it establishes that the
substantial identity requirement can be satisfied by evidence that the
boundaries of prescriptive use were the first line of stable vegetation and
the mean high tide line.
The third segment of the claimed easement extended from the westem edge of the overwash area to the inlet. The court described the publie's use over this area prior to the construction of the subdivision road as
following a sand road extending from the overwash area toward the inlet,
then ending in a "random series of loops and trails. '2 37 Prescriptive acquisition over this land raises two questions. The first is whether substantial identity can be proved when use follows "random loops and
trails." The opinion does not answer this question. It suggests, however,
231. Id.at 53, 404 S.E.2d at 687.

232. Id. at 46, 404 S.E.2d at 683.
233. 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
234. 375 S.W.2d 923 (rex. Ct. App. 1964).
235. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 48, 404 S.E.2d at 684.

236. Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 107; Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 925.
237. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 43, 404 S.E.2d 681.
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that it could, because the claimant must prove only that there existed a
means to determine with reasonable specificity the location of the easement claimed and that the line of travel was sufficiently definite to give
the landowner notice of the extent of the adverse claim. Because the
plaintiff's burden is greatly diminished "where the easement claimed is
across windswept, shifting sands which are subject to ocean storms," evidence of "looping trails" may be sufficient to prove substantial identity,
particularly when use later shifted to a defined road.23 The second issue
arises from the rule that a public prescriptive easement may be perfected
only when both ends of the claimed path lie in public places.239 If this
position were adopted in North Carolina, a finding on remand that substantial identity ended where the sand road disappeared into loops and
trails could defeat public prescription of the entire subdivision road, or at
least the portion of the road lying between the overwash and the inlet.
Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court discussed
whether public prescriptive acquisition can occur when public authorities
have not undertaken maintenance of the road. As Justice Mitchell
pointed out in dissent, however, several early cases suggested that maintenance by public authorities is an essential element of public prescription in North Carolina.2" The courts' silence on the issue lends support
to the argument that public maintenance is not an essential element of
public prescription, but may be critical evidence of other essential
elements.2 4 1
Evidence of maintenance by public authorities can serve two important functions in public prescription cases. First, it may show that the
landowner was on notice throughout the prescriptive period that the interest asserted was claimed by the public at large and not merely by a
group of individuals.2 42 Second, it may prove that the use was notoriously adverse to the interest of the landowner.2 4 While it is settled that
the claimant bears the burden of proving both of these facts in public
prescription cases, it is not clear that evidence of public maintenance
should be the only means by which these facts can be proved. Adverse
use unquestionably can be shown without public maintenance, particularly when use occurred despite landowner objections. While public
maintenance could serve as a bright-line rule for determining whether the
238. Id. at 47, 404 S.E.2d at 683.
239. See Layman v. Gnegy, 26 Md. App. 114, 117, 337 A.2d 126, 128 (1975); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 343, at 214.
240. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 56, 44 S.E.2d at 688 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
241. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
242. See Degnan, supra note 21, at 953.
243. Id.
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landowner has been given notice that a public easement has been
claimed, it would be an underinclusive rule. Circumstances exist in
which public maintenance has not occurred where the landowner has
been given unmistakable notice by the character and extent of the use in
which a public easement has been claimed. Such situations are particularly likely to occur in coastal environments where sand roads are often
not strictly maintained and where use by vacationers from many different
areas of the state is common. For these reasons, maintenance by public
authorities should not be an essential element of public prescription.
Several aspects of the Concerned Citizens decision have important
ramifications for perpendicular beach access in North Carolina. The
North Carolina courts traditionally have taken the approach that "prescription is disfavored in the law," and have developed a presumption of
permissive use that is extremely difficult for claimants to overcome in
many cases.'" The tests employed to determine whether landowner objection constitutes an interruption of prescriptive use and whether prescriptive use has followed a sufficiently definite path have similarly
created barriers to prescriptive acquisition in North Carolina.24 This
result has been justified by the overarching public policy in North Carolina to reward or encourage "neighborly act[s]. 24 6 The courts have been
loathe to punish a landowner who generously gave to the public or her
neighbors a license to cross her property.2 47 This suspicion of prescription has been particularly great in cases in which public easements are
claimed; maintenance and control by public authorities have been required in every case, either as an essential element of public prescription
or as evidence of adverse use.24 8 In Concerned Citizens the traditional
distrust of prescriptive acquisition ran headlong into another overarching
public policy, the state's duty to preserve public access to oceanfront
244. See, e.g., Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 666-67, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1981) ('[U]ser
is presumed to be permissive.").
245. See supra notes 88-122 and accompanying text.
246. Potts, 301 N.C. at 666-67, 273 S.E.2d at 288; see, e.g., Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C.
289, 292, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908-09 (1944) ("Neighborliness is a virtue the law neither condemns
nor penalizes. Hence, the use by defendants must be hostile in character, repelling the inference that it was permissive and with the owner's consent."); Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Ahoskie, 202 N.C. 585, 592, 163 S.E. 565, 568 (1932) ("Neighborly conduct either on the part of a
person or corporation ought not to be so construed as to take their property."); Johnson v.
Stanley, 96 N.C. App. 72, 74, 384 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1989) (because "landowner's mere neighborly act of allowing someone to pass over his property" should not "operate to deprive the
owner of his land[,] ... mere use alone is presumed to be permissive") (citations omitted).
247. Ahoskie, 202 N.C. at 592, 163 S.E. at 568.
248. E.g., Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 188, 193 S.E. 153, 155 (1937)
(evidence of adverse use); Town of Sparta v. Hamm, 97 N.C. App. 82, 87, 387 S.E.2d 173, 176,
disc rev. denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990) (essential element of public
prescription).
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beaches. The court responded by making it much more difficult for landowners to interrupt prescriptive use, modifying the substantial identity
test to allow prescription in a coastal environment where routes of travel
move with the shifting sands, and by choosing not to adopt the underinclusive bright-line rule that maintenance by public authorities is an essential element of public prescription.
Although each of these changes in North Carolina's prescription
doctrine will enhance its usefulness in preserving perpendicular public
beach access, the presumption of permissive use will continue to create a
substantial barrier to prescriptive acquisition in cases in which the landowner has not objected to the use and the users have not expressly
claimed a right to use a path. One may argue the expansion of the prescriptive doctrine in Concerned Citizens signals an end to North Carolina's distrust of the prescription doctrine and will eventually lead to
abandonment of its minority position on the presumption of permissive
use. However, such a change appears unlikely given the supreme court's
clear reaffirmation of the permissive presumption only a decade ago in
Potts v. Burnette.24 9 An alternative argument is that a presumption of
adverse use should be adopted only in cases involving access to ocean
beaches. The primary justification for the permissive presumption is that
a landowner should not be punished for acts of "neighborliness."250
Thus, the presumption seeks to protect the landowner who neither objects nor permits use expressly, but, because the users have not expressly
asserted a right to use the path, assumes that the users believe that they
are using the land with his permission. This set of circumstances simply
does not exist on the oceanfront. The public expectation that some public right of access to ocean beaches exists or should exist is pervasive;
oceanfront property owners, possibly more than anyone else, are clearly
cognizant of this public expectation. Thus, it is illogical to protect an
249. 301 N.C. 663, 273 S.E.2d 285 (1981). The Potts court stated:
Plaintiffs have vigorously urged us to reject our present position that a user is presumed to be permissive and adopt the rule, obtaining in the majority ofjurisdictions,
that the user is presumed to be adverse. This we decline to do. An easement by
prescription, like adverse possession, is not favored in the law, and we deem it the
better-reasoned view to place the burden of proving every essential element, including hostility, on the party who is claiming against the interests of the true owner.
Additionally we note that "[tlhe modern tendency is to restrict the right of one to
acquire a prescriptive right-of-way whereby another, through a mere neighborly act,
may be deprived of his property.by its becoming vested in one whom he favored."
Thus, in order for plaintiffs to succeed in their claim, they must have shown sufficient
evidence of the hostile character of their use to create an issue of fact for the jury.
Id at 666-67, 273 S.E.2d at 288 (citations omitted) (quoting 2 THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 335,
at 145).
250. See supra note 246.
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oceanfront landowner for the reason that he has not been given notice
that beachgoers have claimed an interest adverse to his own.
North Carolina's presumption of permissive use represents a public
policy decision to protect the landowner who does not "sleep on his

rights" because he has not been given notice of the adverse interest.
Other courts have relied on other public policy considerations, particularly the public interest in maintaining possession of real property in the
hands of persons making the most efficient use of it,25 ' in adopting the
presumption of adverse use. Most important, because the permissive presumption originates in public policy, the presumption should be changed
if a more compelling competing public policy exists.2 52 The North Carolina legislature has established clearly that the preservation of public
beach access is an important public policy goal.25 3 The court's treatment
of the uninterrupted use requirement in Concerned Citizens evidences judicial recognition of this same public policy goal. 254 Given this recogni-

tion, the courts should adopt a presumption of adverse use in cases
involving beach access to reflect the public policy goal of preserving public beach access.

The most significant aspect of the Concerned Citizens opinion is its
potential impact on lateral access issues. In resolving conflicts arising
out of differing public and private expectations of public property rights
in the dry-sand beach, several coastal states, following the Texas model
251. See Macy, supra note 75, at 779.
252. See Livingston, supra note 224, at 675-76 (stating that courts should be, and often are,
more willing to allow intrusions on private property rights through their application of common-law doctrines when a significant public benefit, like access to public waters, is at stake).
253. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.1 (1989):
The public has traditionally fully enjoyed the State's ocean and estuarine beaches and
public access to and use of the beaches. The beaches provide a recreational resource
of great importance to North Carolina and its citizens and this makes a significant
contribution to the economic well-being of the State. The ocean and estuarine
beaches are resources of statewide significance and have been customarily freely used
and enjoyed by people throughout the State. Public access to North Carolinas
beaches is, however, becoming severely limited in some areas.... Public purposes
would be served by providing increased access to ocean and estuarine beaches ....
There is therefore, a pressing need in North Carolina... for the identification, acquisition, improvement and maintenance of public access ways to the ocean and estuanine beaches.
This legislative policy has been adopted at the administrative level by the North Carolina
Coastal Resources Commission and is implemented by the Division of Coastal Management.
See N.C. ADMiN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 7H.0306(a)(5) (Nov. 1991) ("Established common-law and
statutory public rights of access to the public trust lands and waters shall not be eliminated or
restricted. Development shall not encroach upon public accessways nor shall it limit the intended use of the accessways.").
254. See supra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
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in Seaway, have recognized public prescription of the dry-sand beach.2 55
Prior to Concerned Citizens, the North Carolina courts had not addressed whether the public could acquire rights to the dry-sand by prescription. Several aspects of North Carolina's public prescription
doctrine, however, undermined its applicability to the dry-sand. Public
prescription has occurred in North Carolina only when the prescriptive
use has been similar to the use of a public road or street.2 56 A public
road or street typically has precise, permanent boundaries. In Concerned
Citizens the court favorably noted the Seaway decision, which held that
the boundaries of the dry-sand beach (the first line of stable vegetation
and the mean high tide line) were sufficient to define the boundaries of a
public prescriptive easement because they are "natural monuments and
as calls in a description of land are of the highest dignity."25 7 The Concerned Citizens court's reliance on Seaway and Feinman, which established that a public easement over the dry-sand beach moves as the beach
erodes and accretes,2 8 clearly indicates that public prescriptive easement
can be acquired over the dry-sand beach despite the dissimilarities between such an easement and a typical public road. A public road also is
typically used solely as a line of travel. In Concerned Citizens, as in Seaway, the dry-sand was used both as a line of travel and for general recreational use.2 59 Use of oceanfront beaches virtually always involves some
travel, if only in the form of pedestrians strolling along the sand. The
issue presented is whether recreational uses such as sunbathing and fishing, which cannot be defined as travel, may also be considered prescriptive use. The Concerned Citizens opinion, by recognizing that the nature
of public use of coastal lands differs inherently from that of inland roads,
suggests that recreational uses may also be considered prescriptive use.2 1
The permissive presumption continues to present a barrier to public
255. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171
(1970); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel
Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 594, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d
372, 377-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
256. See, eg., Town of Sparta v. Hamm, 97 N.C. App. 82, 87, 387 S.E.2d 173, 176, disc.
rev. denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 819 (1990) (holding that street continually used by
public was easement).
257. Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 939 (rex. Civ. App. 1964). The Seaway court noted that "[tihis requirement of a definite route is required so the owner may have
notice of not only the fact of adverse claim but the extent of it," and established that the
"physical nature of the beach" defined a route sufficient to give the landowner the required
notice. Id This argument is identical to that made by the Concerned Citizens court in its
treatment of the substantial identity issue. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 47, 404 S.E.2d at
682.
258. Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 108-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
259. See Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 933; supra note 46 and accompanying text.
260. Concerned Citizens, 329 N.C. at 47, 404 S.E.2d at 682.
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prescription of the dry-sand beach. 2 6 1 The arguments supporting a presumption of adverse use in perpendicular beach access cases apply
equally to the dry-sand beach.2 62 The need to protect the "neighborly"
landowner is nonexistent because it is common knowledge that many
members of the general public believe a public right to use the dry-sand
exists. The public policy behind preserving public use of the dry-sand is
well established. A third justification for reversing the permissive presumption applies solely to the dry-sand beach. Because the dry-sand
263
beach is unsuitable for development due to overwash in severe storms,
a public easement over the dry-sand neither deprives the landowner of
the right to develop his land nor deprives the public of any gains in efficiency attributable to private ownership of land.
Even given the expansion of the public prescription doctrine in Concerned Citizens, there remain significant drawbacks to the use of the pre2 64
scription theory for preserving public access to the dry-sand beach.
Reliance on the prescription doctrine demands much litigation because it
requires a separate showing of proof for each stretch of beach. In addition, it will succeed only on those beaches on which public use has been
common for many years. Extensive public use follows the construction
of the public infrastructure allowing access to a barrier island. In several
coastal areas of North Carolina, such access has been recently constructed or does not yet exist. Finally, the prescription doctrine encourages oceanfront landowners to attempt to interrupt prescriptive use by
preventing use of their property. For this reason, an expansion of the
doctrine may serve to close more beaches than it opens.
Three other common-law doctrines provide alternatives to prescription for creating public access to the dry-sand. The implied dedication
doctrine presents each of the above drawbacks as well as a fourth, the
need to prove acceptance by public authorities through evidence of public maintenance and control.2 6 5 The custom doctrine was applied in Ore261. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1974) (finding
that a presumption of permissive use could not be overcome when public use of a privately
owned area of dry-sand beach had occurred for over 65 years, but when public use was consistent with the interests of the landowner, who operated a commercial pier and recreation
center).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
263. All oceanfront beaches in North Carolina fall within the "Ocean Hazard Area" Area
of Environmental Concern (AEC). N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1iA, r. 7H.0306(a) (Nov. 1991).
Within this AEC, virtually all development is prohibited oceanward of a "setback line" established at least 60 feet landward of the first line of stable vegetation. Id. r. 7H.0306(a)(1). For
the broad definition of "development" to which this rule applies, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-

103(5) (1989).
264. See Carmichael, supra note 11, at 164-65.
265. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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gon for the specific purpose of avoiding the limitations of the prescription
doctrine by creating an interest in all beaches at once; however, no precedent for use of the custom doctrine exists in North Carolina.2 66 Only the
public trust doctrine addresses the drawbacks of the prescription doctrine and is well grounded in the common law of North Carolina. Several commentators have suggested that an expansion of the scope of the
public trust doctrine to include beach property landward of the mean
high tide line could best address these problems and preserve traditional
expectations of the public's right to use the beach.2 67
The only reference to the public trust doctrine in Concerned Citizens
occurs in the supreme court's express disavowal of a statement made by
the court of appeals that the public trust doctrine should not be extended
"'to deprive individual property owners of some portion of their property rights without compensation.' "26 It is not clear from the court of
appeals' statement whether it was referring to the perpendicular or lateral beach access issue.2 69 Only one conclusion can be drawn from the
supreme court's brief reference to the public trust doctrine: the court did
not want to foreclose the possibility that public rights to use the dry-sand
beach could exist by virtue of the public trust doctrine. 270 Obviously,
this conclusion is far from judicial recognition of such public rights. The
Concerned Citizens court's willingness to reshape the public prescription
doctrine to allow prescriptive acquisition of the dry-sand and to make
prescriptive use much more difficult to interrupt does evince judicial rec266. See Carmichael, supra note 11, at 174-75.
267. See Finnell, supra note 16, at 677. One commentator argues that,
[t]he public trust doctrine should become the theoretical foundation for assuring reasonable public access to coastal public property. It should become a principal theory
supporting public rights of access to public property, for protecting public rights
already perfected under other common-law theories, and a key factor for courts to
weigh when applying the multifactored takings analysis.
Id.; see Ted J. Hanning, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed
BalancingTest, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 211, 235 (1983); Karen Oehme, JudicialExpansion
of the Public Trust Doctrine; Creatinga Right of PublicAccess to Florida'sBeaches, 3 J. LAND
Usu & ENVTL. L. 75, 92-94 (1987); Carmichael, supra note 11, at 200-01. But see Spalding,
supra note 181, at 64 (suggesting that the public trust doctrine is, and is likely to remain, a
strictly aquatic doctrine).
268. ConcernedCitizens, 329 N.C. at 55, 404 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting Concerned Citizens of
Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v. Holden Beach Enters., 95 N.C. App. 38, 46, 381 S.E.2d
810, 815 (1989), rev'd, 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677 (1991)).
269. The claimants' public trust arguments, however, addressed only the public's right to
use the dry-sand beach. Brief for Appellant-Intervenor at 11-21, Concerned Citizens (No.
8813-SC-1075).
270. In Cooper v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1991), a federal tax case
described supra note 196, the court considered the treatment of the public trust doctrine in
Concerned Citizens and concluded only that "[t]he extent to which the public trust doctrine
applies to dry sand property is an unsettled question." Cooper, 779 F. Supp. at 835.
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ognition of the public policy goal of maintaining public beach access.
Taken together, the recognition of this policy, the decision to disavow the
court of appeals' statement limiting the public trust doctrine, and the
existence of legislation indicating that public trust rights exist in the drysand 27 1 suggest that an expansion of the public trust doctrine similar to
that adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Matthews is foreseeable in North Carolina.
Several advantages commend the public trust doctrine over other
common-law doctrines for establishing public rights in the dry-sand
beach. Unlike the prescription doctrine, the public trust doctrine would
apply uniformly to every ocean beach in the state.27 2 It would thus eliminate the need for burdensome beach-by-beach litigation and would allow
public access to beaches that are now unaccessible to the public. While
the public prescription doctrine allows only the creation of a permanent
easement in the public, the public trust doctrine can be flexibly employed
to protect the interest of the landowner while creating public rights sufficient to allow free enjoyment of ocean beaches.2 73 Finally, the public
trust doctrine most closely mirrors the expectations of the citizens of
North Carolina.27 4 Public expectation is that the right to enjoy ocean
beaches exists, not by virtue of an acquired property interest, but because
the right to use oceanfront beaches has always existed as a necessary part
of public use of the ocean."27
Concerned Citizens changes the doctrine of prescription in North
Carolina by establishing that: (1) To interrupt prescriptive use the landowner must undertake some overt act protesting the use, with the intent
to interrupt use, and must succeed in actually interrupting use for some
substantial period of time; (2) to establish "substantial identity" the
claimant need only prove that the use followed a path sufficiently definite
both to allow reasonable determination of the location of the claimed
easement and to give the landowner notice of its extent; and (3) maintenance by public authorities is not an essential element of public prescription. These are reasonable changes that move North Carolina closer to
the common law of prescription applied in the majority of states. The
court's application of the "uninterrupted" test evinced recognition of the
public policy in favor of preserving public beach access. The decision
was unusual, however, because the court suggested that a period of time
271.
272.
363-65,
273.
274.
275.

See supra note 197.
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 321-24, 471 A.2d 355,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Carmichael, supra note 11, at 183.
Matthews, 95 N.J. at 324, 471 A.2d at 365; see Carmichael, supra note 11, at 183.
See Carmichael, supra note 11, at 183.
Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322-23, 471 A.2d at 364.
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longer than that required in other states will be necessary to constitute an
interruption of prescriptive use in North Carolina, and because the burden of proof placed on the claimant asserting uninterrupted use was
slight. Joining several other coastal states, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has recognized that a public prescriptive easement can be perfected in the dry-sand beach and that the interest created will move as
the shoreline erodes and accretes.
To enable prescriptive acquisition of an easement over the dry-sand,
the court should go further and reverse its presumption of permissive use
in cases involving public beach access. The justifications for a presumption of adverse use are convincing. The need to protect the "neighborly"
landowner is minimal because widely held public expectations give the
landowner notice that public use of beaches occurs by claim of right.
Further, the public policy to preserve beach access must be weighed
against the public policy protecting the landowner. Finally, because the
dry-sand beach is unsuitable for development, the interest protected
under the permissive presumption is less significant.
The public prescription doctrine is a limited tool for preserving public access to the dry-sand beach because it demands burdensome litigation, applies only where long public use has occurred, and encourages
oceanfront landowners to prevent use of their property. The public trust
doctrine should be expanded to recognize public rights of access to the
dry-sand beach on all beaches of the state. The citizens of North Carolina have for generations recognized ocean beaches as one of their most
prized resources and have harbored the expectation that these beaches,
like the ocean itself, should remain open for public enjoyment. By recognizing the existence of public trust rights in the dry-sand beach,
North
Carolina could permanently root this expectation in the common law of
the state.
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